Do Households Smooth Expenditure over Anticipated Income Changes? Evidence from Bonus Payments to Public Employees in Japan by Hori, Masahiro & Shimizutani, Satoshi
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Do Households Smooth Expenditure over Anticipated
Income Changes? Evidence from Bonus Payments to
Public Employees in Japan








Do Households Smooth Expenditure over Anticipated Income Changes? 
Evidence from Bonus Payments to Public Employees in Japan
† 
 





This paper provides  new  evidence of  consumers’  reaction to an anticipated sizable 
change in income. Until FY2002, Japanese public employees received predictable large 
bonus payments three times a fiscal  year  (in June, December, and March),  but the 
March bonus was abolished in FY2003. We compare the seasonal patterns of public 
employees’ expenditure before and after the reform of the bonus payment schedule. 
Contrary to the prediction of the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH), we 
find  evidence  that  monthly patterns of household expenditure were significantly 
affected by the anticipated large change in income pattern. However, at closer 
inspection, this  excess sensitivity of expenditure is observed only for expenditure 
subcategories  of  some  durability, i.e., durables and semi-durables. Thus, while the 
LC/PIH does not appear to hold for expenditure (which we observe here), it may still 
hold for consumption. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the central tenets of the standard life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis 
(LC/PIH) is that individuals engage in consumption smoothing
1  and that income 
changes that are anticipated should not affect the pattern of consumption. According to 
the hypothesis, individuals optimizing their consumption path dynamically over their 
lifetime respond to a (predicted) change in income at the time they become aware of the 
change, not when it actually materializes. Therefore, in theory, there should be no 
association between individuals’ pattern of consumption and an anticipated change in 
the pattern of income unless some underlying assumptions of the LC/PIH, such as the 
absence of liquidity constraints, are violated. 
However, notwithstanding the straightforward theoretical prediction, empirical 
studies on the LC/PIH have produced mixed results. A number of empirical studies 
using aggregate data, such as Campbell and Mankiw (1989), have reported that 
consumers in fact do respond to predicted income changes at the time they occur (rather 
than when they first becomes aware of them). Recent empirical studies using micro data 
to examine the impact of policy-induced income changes have obtained similar findings 
(Souleles, 1999, 2002; Parker, 1999; Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995, 2003; and Shimizutani, 
2006). On the other hand, there are also a number of micro data-based studies focusing 
on the effect of large and regular (easily predictable) income movements that report that 
the LC/PIH describes consumption behavior well (Paxson, 1993; Browning and Collado, 
2001; and Hsieh, 2003). 
These conflicting findings may be explained by the fact that earlier studies 
focused on income shock episodes of different sizes and types to identify the effect of 
                                                   
1  The standard LC/PIH predicts that households will smooth their marginal utility but not necessarily consumption 
itself.   3 
 
predicted income changes on consumption. While studies that examined relatively small 
anticipated income movements caused by policy changes often found excess sensitivity 
in consumption, other studies that examined the effect of large and regular income 
movements appear to find consumption smoothing.
2  Some scholars employ the 
bounded rationality argument that consumers behave in the manner predicted by the 
LC/PIH when the cost of calculating the anticipated income change is low and the 
utility gain from smoothing consumption is large.   
While the bounded rationality argument appeals to economists as it allows for 
rational economic agents, whether it really holds is open to discussion. Another possible 
explanation for the mixed results is that some of the cases examined in previous studies 
were not appropriate episodes for testing the consumption response to anticipated 
income changes. More concretely, most of the income change data examined in 
previous studies were constructed using observed household characteristics that are not 
necessarily randomly distributed (see Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006; Coulibaly 
and Li, 2006; and Stephens, 2008 for a discussion of this point). In other words, a 
certain share of previous studies on this topic probably fail to validate the assumption 
that household characteristics used to construct household income changes are 
uncorrelated with all other unobserved determinants of consumption growth, rendering 
their empirical findings less reliable.   
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to exploit an ideal episode 
of exogenous income change and reliable micro data from Japan’s Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES) to re-examine the issue of consumption smoothing in 
                                                   
2  A few more recent studies (Stephens and Unayama, 2011; Hori and Shimizutani, 2009) on Japanese households, for 
which very detailed and reliable diary-based monthly FIES data are available, report that the monthly patterns of 
expenditure appear to be significantly affected by anticipated large changes in the pattern of individuals’ income. 4 
 
response to a predictable income change. Specifically, the episode we focus on is the 
following. Until FY2002, public employees in Japan conventionally received large and 
predictable bonus payments three times a year, in June, December, and March; however, 
the March bonus was abolished from FY2003 (i.e., from March 2004), with sufficient 
advance notice given in FY2002. As this represents a large and predictable income 
change, we utilize this episode to test the LC/PIH by comparing the seasonal pattern of 
public employees’ expenditure before and after the change in the pattern of bonus 
payments. Although the FIES only provides data on household expenditure (rather than 
consumption), we attempt to examine household consumption patterns by focusing on a 
number of expenditure subcategories of different durability, that is, non-durables, 
services, semi-durables, and durables. 
    The combination of an ideal episode and the rich information provided by the 
micro-level data from the FIES presents us with a perfect setting for the examination of 
households’ reaction to an anticipated income change. The reasons are as follows. First, 
salary and bonus payments to public employees in Japan are exogenously 
predetermined. While bonus payments in the private sector are also large, predictable, 
and highly institutionalized, it is likely that at least part of these bonuses are 
performance-based, leaving room for discriminating payments, and whether a worker 
receives a bonus or not may not be random. On the other hand, as described in the 
following section, bonus payments to public employees are regulated by law, leaving no 
room for performance-based adjustments, and are therefore anticipated without 
uncertainty. By comparing the seasonal pattern of public employees’ expenditure before 
and after the bonus payment reform, we can avoid potential endogeneity from 
non-random observations.   5 
 
  Second, the episode of the bonus payment reform in the Japanese public sector 
allows us to examine consumers’ response to a sizable change in the timing of income 
payments, since the amount of lifetime earnings remained largely unchanged. That is, 
although the March bonus, which was equivalent to roughly half a month’s salary, was 
abolished from FY2003, the total amount of annual bonus payments remained broadly 
unchanged, since the bonus amount was simply added to the other two bonus payments, 
thus resulting in larger bonuses in June and December. As in the episode examined by 
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), this episode allows us to distill the effect of an anticipated 
income change without considering other factors that could affect a household’s 
permanent income.   
  Third, the monthly income and expenditure data from the FIES are considered 
to be highly reliable. Data reliability is of crucial importance for the Euler equation 
analysis, which uses a first difference-based specification. While earlier studies that 
examined large and regular income changes used retrospective quarterly data, the FIES 
data used in this paper are monthly data based on family account books (diaries) that 
sample households are requested to fill in and that are collected twice a month. 
Therefore, there are likely to be far fewer measurement errors in the FIES expenditure 
data than in the datasets used in earlier studies, such as the U.S. Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, which asks households to recall their spending over the previous three months. 
  Although studies on large and regular income changes using quarterly data so 
far have not yet rejected the LC/PIH, they may have overlooked a deviation from it 
owing to the less reliable quality of the retrospective data used. Therefore, our question 
is whether the expenditure patterns of public employees, which were recorded in the 
reliable monthly FIES data, were significantly affected by the exogenous change in the 6 
 
pattern of income due to the abolition of the March bonus in FY2003. To do so, we 
basically compare the expenditure pattern of public employees in the post-reform period 
(July 2003–June 2008) with that in the pre-reform period (July 1997–June 2002). In the 
first instance, we do so without any control group in our regression analysis. Later, we 
then use private sector employees as a control group to confirm that our results do not 
reflect factors common to public and private sector employees. 
In contrast with earlier studies on the effect of large and regular income 
movements (such as Browning and Collado, 2001, and Hsieh, 2003), we find that 
Japanese public employee households did not entirely smooth their expenditure in the 
face of an anticipated large change in the pattern of income. The monthly pattern of 
public employees’ expenditure significantly changed after the abolition of the March 
bonus, seemingly rejecting the LC/PIH. However, taking a closer look, it emerges that 
excess sensitivity of expenditure is clearly observed only for expenditure subcategories 
of some durability, i.e., durables and semi-durables. Therefore, our result does not rule 
out the possibility that Japanese households are still smoothing the flow of services 
from the consumption of durables, as the LC/PIH essentially predicts. 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
bonus system for Japanese public employees and the abolition of the March bonus in 
FY2003. Section 3 explains the FIES dataset used in this study. Section 4 runs several 
regressions to compare the monthly expenditure patterns of public employees before 
and after the March bonus abolition. Section 5 then extends the regressions to include 
private sector employees as a control group to examine the robustness of our findings. 
Finally, Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes. 
 7 
 
2. Bonus payments to public employees and the abolition of the March bonus   
In Japan, the salaries and allowances of workers in the central government are 
uniformly regulated by law, with the National Personnel Authority (Jinji in, henceforth 
NPA) in charge of administration.
3  The salary schedules and allowances, including 
bonus payments for national government employees, are revised annually in August 
based on NPA recommendations (in the “Remuneration Report and Recommendation”) 
for the next fiscal year,
4  mainly taking account of the salary gap between the private 
and the public sector. The proposal is then debated in parliament and, in most cases, 
approved without modification in the fall of the year before it takes effect. The process 
is open to public scrutiny and widely reported in the media, making payment schedules 
in the next year fairly predictable.   
  It is important to stress here that monthly salary payments and bonuses for 
public employees are completely predetermined and, unlike in private firms, unaffected 
by personal performance. Moreover, unlike bonus payments in the private sector that 
fluctuate depending on current business conditions, the bonus amount and payment date 
are scheduled entirely in advance and anticipated without uncertainty. Salaries and 
allowances for local government employees follow the pay schedule for central 
government employees, although there are minor variations across prefectures and 
municipalities. 
    Table 1 shows the value of public employees’ bonus payments (relative to 
monthly regular salaries) and their distribution within the fiscal year for the period 1997 
to 2008. The annual total of bonus payments is quite sizable (roughly 5 months’ salary) 
                                                   
3  Salaries consist of a monthly salary, salary adjustment pay, and (for teachers) teacher’s duty pay. Allowances 
include living allowances, area allowances, and overtime allowances as well as bonus payments. Bonus payments 
consist of a term-end allowance (kimatsu teate) and a diligence allowance (kinben teate), which, despite of what the 
name suggests, is paid irrespective of performance. 
4  The fiscal year in Japan begins in April and ends in March.   8 
 
and payments are made at regular intervals over the fiscal year (i.e., in June, December, 
and – until FY2002 – March). As will be seen later, annual total bonuses relative to 
monthly regular salaries are roughly similar for public sector employees and private 
sector employees working for a large firm with a bonus system, although in the case of 
private sector employees, bonuses are paid only in June (or July) and December, but not 
in March. The dates of the bonus payments for public employees are June 30 (summer), 
December 10 (winter), and (until FY2002) March 15 (spring), although the dates are 
moved forward to a weekday if the corresponding date falls on a weekend or a holiday. 
While the ratio of bonus payments to monthly regular salaries has been 
gradually falling in the public sector (Table 1) – probably in response to smaller bonus 
payments in the private sector since the late 1990s (shown later) – the change that is 
more important for our analysis here is the abolition of the March bonus in FY2003 
(April 2003–March 2004). As shown in the table, the March bonus for public 
employees amounted to about half a month’s regular salary until FY2001. FY2002 was 
a transition year in terms of bonus payments and the size of the March bonus (paid in 
March 2003) relative to monthly regular salaries was reduced to 20 percent. Finally, in 
August 2002, more than a year in advance, government employees were notified of the 
abolition of the March bonus from FY2003. 
 
3. Data description 
The data used in this study are micro-level data from the Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES) covering the period from July 1997 to June 2008. The FIES 
is the Japanese government’s main source of information on aggregate consumption 
expenditure (by households) and is administrated by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of 9 
 
Internal Affairs and Communications. The survey covers approximately 8,000 
households from all over Japan. Single-member households and households employed 
in agriculture or fisheries are not surveyed.
5  We use observations for the five-year 
period from July 1997 to June 2002 before the abolition of the March bonus 
(“pre-reform period”) and observations for the five-year period from July 2003 to June 
2008 after the abolition (“post-reform period”). We excluded observations for the period 
between July 2002 and June 2003, when the March bonus was gradually being phased 
out, as we are interested in whether consumers respond to a predicted change in income 
when it actually materializes. Since the LC/PIH predicts that consumers respond to the 
change in income at the time they become aware of it, including the phase-out period, 
when the abolition of the March bonus was announced, would obscure the point of our 
analysis.
6 
The sampling design consists of three steps. First, approximately 170 
municipalities (cities/towns/villages) are chosen using stratified sampling based on 
location, population, and other factors. Second, survey units (one unit consists of 100 
households) are randomly chosen from all selected municipalities. Third, six 
non-single-member households are randomly chosen in each survey unit. Each 
household is surveyed for six months and one-sixth of the households are replaced by 
new households every month, making it possible to construct six-month panels of 
1,200−1,300 households on average. The survey provides detailed information on 
                                                   
5  The FIES began covering households engaged in agriculture or fisheries in July 1999 and single-member 
households in January 2002, adding a further 1,000 households to the sample for a current sample size of 9,000 
households. We did not use those households in the sample to maintain consistency of the sampling design 
throughout the estimation period. 
6  For readers interested in what happened in the gradual phase-out period, Appendix 1 reports the monthly income 
and expenditure patterns between July 2002 and June 2003 to provide a comparison with the pre- and post-reform 
patterns. Broadly speaking, expenditure patterns in the phase-out period appear to fall between those in the 
pre-reform and those in the post-reform period. 10 
 
income and expenditures for individual households as well as on the characteristics of 
these households and the jobs of household heads. The monthly expenditure data are 
compiled from a diary collected twice a month, meaning that our dataset likely is more 
reliable than most other datasets, which are typically based on retrospective 
questionnaires.
7   
To ensure that our findings in this paper do not depend on sample selection, we 
employed two different samples in the empirical analysis below, that is, a 
“broadly-defined sample” and a “narrowly-defined sample”. To construct the former, 
we dropped observations for households with a self-employed (or a jobless) household 
head since we do not have monthly income information for these households. After 
dropping households for which monthly income information is not available, our 
analysis is restricted to wage earner households, which account for roughly half of all 
observations in the FIES. We further confine our sample to households where the head 
of household is an office, or white-collar, worker. Using this broadly-defined sample, 
we will examine whether the seasonal expenditure pattern of public employee 
households changed after the abolition of the March bonus. To confirm the validity of 
the findings, we will also examine whether the observed changes in the seasonal pattern 
differ between public sector employee households (the “public sector group”) and 
private sector employee households (the “private sector group”), using households 
whose head works for a large private company with more than 1,000 employees as our 
control group.   
  Although we focus on white-collar households so as to examine households of 
                                                   
7  The FIES simply asks respondents to enter their expenditures by category in a diary. The form to be filled in by 
respondents and instructions for diary keeping can be found in Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
(various years). When publishing the FIES, the Ministry groups the goods and services listed in the diary into four 
categories (based on their durability). Details of the classification of specific goods into the four categories are shown 
in Appendix 2. 11 
 
roughly comparable attributes, occupational choice is not entirely random, and there 
remains some heterogeneity between the two groups (other than the timing of bonus 
receipts). Moreover, the two groups in the broadly-defined sample contain households 
that receive bonuses in months other than the regular bonus months, i.e., June (or July) 
and December in the case of private sector employees, and June, December, and – until 
FY2002 – March in the case of public sector employees, or that receive no bonuses at 
all. Therefore, to make the two groups homogeneous except for the timing of bonus 
receipts, we additionally construct the narrowly-defined sample. We do so by further 
confining our sample to male sole earner households and excluding households that 
reported no bonus receipts in the regular bonus months, i.e., June (or July
8), December, 
and March for public employee households until FY2002, and June (or July) and 
December for public and private sector employee households from FY2003 (either 
because they received no bonuses or failed to enter them in the diary). Moreover, we 
exclude households that report bonus receipts in months other than the regular bonus 
months. The number of observations in the narrowly-defined sample is about 40 percent 
of that in the broadly-defined sample. 
  Table 2 shows the ratio of bonus receipts to regular monthly salaries (both for 
all households, i.e., including those not receiving a bonus, and for those receiving a 
bonus) as well as the share of bonus recipients both for the broadly-defined sample 
(Panel (a)) and the narrowly-defined sample (Panel (b)). Looking at the figures for the 
broadly-defined sample, the March bonus/salary ratio for the public sector group in the 
pre-reform period (from July 1997 to June 2002) was 0.28 (for all households) and the 
                                                   
8  We include public employee households that report receiving a bonus in July in our sample, since the standard date 
for the payment of the summer bonus, June 30, makes it almost meaningless to distinguish between June bonuses and 
July bonuses.  12 
 
share of bonus recipients was 63 percent (the average bonus/monthly salary ratio for 
households receiving a bonus was 0.45). On the other hand, the ratio for the private 
sector group was 0.03 and the share 5 percent. Reflecting the bonus reform, the 
bonus/salary ratio for the public sector group in the post-reform period (from July 2003 
to June 2008) falls to 0.01 months and the share of bonus recipients to 3 percent. 
Looking at the narrowly-defined sample (Panel (b)), we find that the abolition of the 
March bonus for public sector employees means that the bonus/salary ratio fell from 
0.45 to zero. 
Turning to the bonuses in other regular bonus months, roughly 75–85 percent 
of public sector employee households report that they receive a bonus in summer and in 
winter, while the share among private sector employee households is less than 70 
percent. However, looking at the bonus/salary ratio for private sector employee 
households that do receive a bonus, this is more or less comparable to that for public 
sector employee households. When we compare the pre- and post-reform periods, the 
bonus/salary ratios and the bonus recipient shares appear to have decreased in all 
regular bonus months, probably reflecting the slowdown of Japanese economy. 
However, it goes without saying that the fall in bonus receipts (from the pre-reform to 
the post-reform period) is most remarkable for the March bonus for the public sector 
group. Finally, Panel (b) for the narrowly-defined sample confirms that the bonus/salary 
ratio and the bonus recipient share are broadly similar for the two groups except for the 
March bonus payments to the public sector group until FY2002. 
The sample statistics of our dataset are reported in Table 3. The total number of 
observations from July 1997 to June 2008 is 258,328 (for 48,407 households) for the 
broadly-defined sample and 97,155 (for 19,285 households) for the narrowly-defined 13 
 
sample. Roughly two-fifths of the total observations are for public employee households, 
while the remaining three-fifths are for private sector employee households. Since we 
exclude observations for the gradual phase-out period between July 2002 and June 2003, 
the total sample is split into a pre-reform sample of 123,685 observations (23,982 
households) and a post-reform sample of 109,426 observations (21,389 households). 
Shown in the table are the sample statistics for the observation period as a 
whole as well as the two sub-periods (pre-reform and post-reform), for public and 
private sector households together and separately, and for the broadly- and the 
narrowly-defined sample. The results for the sample period as a whole and for the 
sub-periods all paint a similar picture. That is, average household income and 
expenditures are somewhat larger for the public sector than for the private sector group 
in the broadly-defined sample, but look very similar for the two groups in the 
narrowly-defined sample. In addition, in each sample, the two groups also look similar 
in terms of their demographic characteristics such as age of the household head, number 
of family members, and number of workers in the household. Therefore, the sample 
statistics suggest that households in the public and private sector groups are broadly 
similar (except for the bonus payment in March before its abolition), especially when 
the two groups are compared using the narrowly-defined sample. 
      
4. Changes in patterns of monthly expenditure after the bonus reform   
In this section, using monthly observations from the FIES, we examine whether there 
are any changes in the pattern of public employees’ monthly income and expenditure 
from the pre-reform period with the March bonus to the post-reform period without it. 
In order to statistically capture changes after the abolition of the March bonus, we run 14 
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where Xit = Yit or Cit . The dependent variable is monthly changes in the logarithm of 
household income (Yit) or household expenditure (Cit). We use total consumption 
expenditure as well as its subcategories for Cit. Both variables are converted to a daily 
basis using the number of days in each month and deflated by the consumer price index 
for each category. Independent variables consist of twelve month dummies,
9 
) (m MDummy , to capture the monthly income and expenditure patterns in the 
pre-reform period (July 1997 to June 2002) and interaction terms between the month 
dummies and a dummy variable for the post-reform period,  AFTERDUMMY , which 
takes 1 for months from July 2003 to June 2008 and zero otherwise. If there was a 
change in monthly income/expenditure patterns after the abolition of the March bonus, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms should be significant. In addition, we include 
the nominal interest rate and relative price changes as control variables ( t Z ), while  t i, ε  
is assumed to be a well-behaved error term. We employ OLS to obtain the coefficient 
estimates.
10 
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 4.The coefficients on the 
monthly dummies ( 12 ..., , 2 , 1 ; = m am ) correspond to the pattern of monthly 
                                                   
9  Strictly speaking, the model was estimated with a constant and eleven monthly dummies, while we use twelve 
monthly dummies here to simplify our explanation. 
10  In order to derive the seasonal income and expenditure patterns, we also calculated simple sample averages 
without imposing linear restrictions. The calculated patterns look quite similar to those obtained from the regression 
analysis below (see Appendix 3 for a comparison).   15 
 
income/expenditure in the pre-reform period. The pattern of monthly 
income/expenditure in the post-reform period is derived as the sum of the month 
dummy coefficients and the interaction term coefficients ( 12 ..., , 2 , 1 ; = + m b a m m ). The 
panels in Figure 1, which are drawn from the coefficients reported in Table 4, illustrate 
the household income patterns for public sector employee households. Both Figure 
1.1-(a) based on the broadly-defined sample and Figure 1.1-(b) based on the 
narrowly-defined sample clearly illustrate that the change in the pattern of the monthly 
wage of the household head results mainly from the abolition of the March bonus. 
While we also notice a subtle smoothing of monthly wage payments from the pre- to the 
post-reform period, probably due to cuts in bonus amounts not only in March but also in 
other regular bonus months, the changes in other months look very small when 
compared with the striking difference in the month-on-month changes in March and 
April. 
Staying with public sector employees, Figures 1.2-(a) and 1.2-(b) show the 
pattern of households’ disposable income over the year. The figures indicate that 
households’ monthly disposable income is largely determined by the wage of the 
household head. The results in Table 4-(a), which are calculated using the 
broadly-defined sample, suggest that the monthly disposable income of public sector 
employee households used to increase by 10 percent in March and decrease by 18 
percent in April in the pre-reform period. In contrast, in the post-reform period, the 
pattern of monthly disposable income appears to have reversed, as the coefficients on 
the interaction terms more than offset the pre-reform coefficients. The smoothing in 
disposable income in spring comes out more clearly in the narrowly-defined sample 
(see Figure 1.2-(b) and Table 4-(b)). While disposable income used to increase on the 16 
 
previous month by 28 percent in March and decrease by 38 percent in April in the 
pre-reform period, this swing more or less disappeared in the post-reform period, with 
disposable income actually decreasing by 13 percent in March and increasing by 3 
percent in April. In other word, the abolition of the March bonus appears to have 
eliminated the spring income swing for public employees.   
Having confirmed that there was a clear change in the pattern of monthly 
disposable income for public employees, we now turn to their expenditure patterns. 
What matters for us is whether there were any changes in the pattern of monthly 
expenditure from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period, and, if any, whether 
the changes in the monthly expenditure pattern are associated with those in income. 
Therefore, what we focus on is the coefficients on the interaction terms in the 
expenditure regressions. If the pattern of monthly household expenditure is excessively 
sensitive (relative to the prediction of the LC/PIH) and is affected by the pattern of 
monthly income, we would expect March and April expenditures to be higher in the 
pre-reform period than in the post-reform period (with April expenditures likely affected 
by the fact that the spring bonus was paid in the middle of the month, on March 15). 
That is, in that case, the coefficient ( 3 b ) on the interaction term of the March dummy 
and the post-reform dummy should be significantly negative, and that ( 5 b ) on the May 
dummy and the post-reform dummy should be significantly positive.
11   
The results, reported in column (3) of Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 2, look 
generally consistent with this excess sensitivity argument. The monthly pattern of 
consumption expenditure in the post-reform period looks different from that in the 
pre-reform period, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (as 
                                                   
11  The reason why we focus on the May rather than the April interaction term is that the sign on the latter is difficult 
to predict, since the income change in March probably affects expenditure with a lag. 17 
 
indicated by the F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms (bms) are all zero). In addition, the coefficient on the March interaction 
term is negative and statistically significant, suggesting an association between income 
and consumption expenditure. The positive coefficient on the May interaction term, on 
the other hand, is not statistically significant in the regression based on the 
narrowly-defined sample. However, it turns significant in the regression based on the 
narrowly-defined sample. Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that in the regression based on 
the narrowly-defined sample, monthly household expenditure, which in the pre-reform 
period used to increase by 11 percent in March and decrease by 7 percent in May, in the 
post-reform period increases by only 3 percent in March and decreases by the same 
amount in May. 
Although the observed response of household expenditure to the anticipated 
income change may at first glance appear to be inconsistent with the LC/PIH, what the 
hypothesis really predicts is not a smoothing of expenditure but a smoothing of 
consumption. Unfortunately, we cannot observe household consumption directly, since 
what is actually recorded in the FIES diaries is households’ expenditure. Since 
consumption expenditure includes items of different durability, the observed association 
between income and expenditure may have resulted from expenditure on durable goods, 
for which it is reasonable to assume that the lag between expenditure and actual 
consumption is larger than for nondurable goods. 
To examine whether this is the case, we examine expenditure patterns by 
subcategory. The panels in Figure 3, which are drawn based on the coefficients reported 
in columns (4)–(7) of Table 4, illustrate the change in the pattern of monthly 
expenditure on four expenditure subcategories, i.e., services, nondurables, 18 
 
semi-durables, and durables, following the abolition of the March bonus. The F-tests 
show that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the month dummies are the same 
before and after the March bonus abolition (or that the coefficients on the interaction 
terms are zero for all months) is rejected at the 1 percent significance level for almost all 
of the subcategory regressions (except the regression for durables in the 
narrowly-defined sample), again suggesting some deviation from the LC/PIH. However, 
there seem to be clear differences in the extent to which different expenditure 
subcategories are affected: while expenditure on services, semi-durables, and durables 
decreased significantly in March after the bonus reform (Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4), the 
decrease in March in expenditure nondurables (Figure 3.2) is hardly discernable, 
suggesting that the pattern of nondurables expenditure was not greatly affected by the 
abolition of the March bonus. 
To sum up, the abolition of the March bonus for public employees appears to 
have noticeably changed not only the pattern of monthly income but also that of 
monthly expenditure, especially around March. At first glance, this observed association 
between an anticipated change in the pattern of income and actual expenditure looks 
inconsistent with the LC/PIH. However, since the size of the bonus reform-driven 
expenditure changes is very different for expenditure subcategories of different 
durability, suggesting that the observed expenditure responses to the anticipated change 
in the timing of income flows result from a lag between expenditure and actual 
consumption, this leaves open the possibility that although the LC/PIH does not appear 
to hold for expenditure it may still hold for consumption. 
 
5. Including private sector employee households as a control group 19 
 
     The results in the previous section show that the monthly expenditure pattern of 
public employee households changed in and after FY2003. Although the abolition of the 
March bonus is the most obvious candidate to account for the change in expenditure 
patterns, we have not yet excluded other possible factors that might have affected 
expenditure patterns. Returning to Figure 2, it can be seen that the post-reform 
expenditure pattern looks smoother not only in March but also in other months, most 
notably in July-August. This overall smoothing could suggest that factors other than the 
abolition of the March bonus may have been at play. To examine this issue, we use the 
sample of private sector employees as a control group. As already discussed in Section 3, 
the attributes of white-collar workers in the public sector and in large private sector 
firms are not very different, or even look homogeneous in the narrowly-defined sample, 
except for the timing of bonus receipts. Therefore, if something correlated with the 
abolition of the March bonus is responsible for the changes in expenditure patterns, 
inclusion of the control group in our regressions should alter the coefficients on the 
interaction terms in which we are interested. 
Concretely, we extend our dataset to include the private sector group and run 
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where  t i t i t i C or Y X , , , = .
12  Other than  PUBLIC , the variables are the same as in 
equation (1).  PUBLIC   is a dummy variable for the public sector group to distinguish 
it from the private sector group.  m m b a +   captures the pattern of public employees’ 
monthly income/expenditure in the pre-reform period (July 1997–June 2002), while 
m m m m d c b a + + +   captures that in the post-reform period (July 2003–June 2008). In this 
new specification, we can decompose the fall (rise) in March (May) expenditure in the 
post-reform period into the effect of the abolition of the March bonus, i.e., d3 (d5), and 
other factors which are common to the public and private sector groups, i.e., c3 (c5).   
     The panels in Figure 4, which are based on the estimates reported in Table 5, 
illustrate the monthly income patterns of the private and the public sector group. The 
panels show that noticeable changes in the monthly income pattern took place (in 
spring) only for the public group. The monthly income patterns for the private sector 
group in the pre-reform and the post-reform period are largely indistinguishable, 
although the bonus amounts in summer and winter were slightly smaller in the 
post-reform period, while the spring income patterns (from February to May) for the 
public group have become very similar to those of the private group after the bonus 
reform.
13 
     Our main interest is, of course, to see whether a similar transformation in the 
patterns is observed for the expenditure variables. If the monthly expenditure pattern of 
the public sector group stands out from the remaining patterns only in the pre-reform 
period, and if the remaining patterns – those of the public sector group in the 
post-reform period and of the private sector group in both periods – resemble each other, 
                                                   
12  As for the am part, we again run the regression with a constant and eleven month dummies. 
13  Our discussion here focuses on the magnitude in the difference in income patterns (or their “economic 
significance”) that can be gleaned from the figures. In terms of statistical significance, all four income patterns are in 
fact significantly different, probably due to the large sample size of our dataset. 21 
 
this would indicate that the change in the monthly expenditure pattern resulted from the 
abolition of the March bonus. This conclusion would be further supported if we find a 
negative/positive coefficient (d3/d5) on the interaction terms among the March/May 
dummy, the post-reform dummy, and the public sector employee dummy in the 
expenditure regressions. 
     The results of the expenditure regressions (with the control group) are shown in 
Figure 5 and generally support the interpretation that the change in the monthly 
expenditure pattern resulted from the abolition of the March bonus. The monthly 
expenditure patterns do not look very different from each other with the notable 
exception of the pre-reform pattern for the public sector group. Tests of the joint 
hypothesis whether the expenditure patterns in spring (or from February to May) are 
identical between the private and the public sector group suggest that the patterns 
become statistically indistinguishable in the post-reform period, while they were 
significantly different in the pre-reform period (see the F-tests in column (3) in Table 
5-(b) for the narrowly-defined sample).   
While minor changes from the pre-reform to the post-reform period can also be 
noticed for the private sector group, especially for June and December, similar changes 
in the two regular bonus months (or overall smoothing) can be observed for the public 
group, suggesting that these changes probably result from a general decrease in bonus 
payments in the post-reform period (as already reported in Section 2), i.e., a factor 
common to the public and the private sector group. Indeed, after the inclusion of the 
private group in our sample, the statistical significance of the coefficients on the 
interaction terms of interest (the ds) declined considerably, while the sign on the March 
(May) interaction term continues to be negative (positive), which is consistent with the 22 
 
excessively sensitive consumption argument.   
Further examination of the expenditure response for each of the four 
expenditure subcategories (Figure 6 and columns (4)–(7) of Table 5) sheds more light 
on the results obtained so far. The effects of the abolition of the March bonus on 
expenditure on services and nondurables look very small (columns (4) and (5)): The 
absolute value of the coefficients is small and most are statistically insignificant. The 
only exception is the significantly positive coefficient on the May interaction term (d5) 
in the service regression using the narrowly-defined sample (column (4) in Table 5-(b)), 
suggesting that the abolition of the March bonus may have had some effect on the 
expenditure on services. On the other hand, the absolute values of the coefficients for 
the other two expenditure components, semi-durables and durables, are considerably 
larger (especially in the case of durables), although the negative coefficient on the 
March interaction term ( 3 d ) for durables is not significant, probably due to the large 
errors and smaller sample size for this subcategory. 
To sum up, we find that the monthly expenditure pattern of the public sector 
group from February to May, that is, the months in which expenditure is most likely to 
be affected by the abolition of the March bonus, has become very similar to that of the 
private group after the abolition of the March bonus, suggesting some association of 
expenditure and the anticipated sizable change in the timing of income. However, as 
seen in the examination of the public sector employee-only sample in the previous 
section, the sensitivity of expenditure is not uniform across expenditure subcategories: 
an clear reaction of expenditure to the income change is observed only for 
semi-durables and durables. The effect on services expenditure is ambiguous, while 
there is no effect on nondurables expenditure. 23 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
     Despite the large body of literature on consumers’ response to an anticipated 
change in income, the empirical evidence remains inconclusive. Exploiting an ideal 
natural experiment in Japan – the preannounced abolition of the March bonus for 
government officials from March 2004 (FY2003) – this study sought to obtain evidence 
on the absence or presence of consumption smoothing in response to a large and 
predictable change in income. Specifically, using household level panel data from the 
Family Income and Expenditure Survey, we compared the pattern of public employees’ 
monthly expenditure before and after the reform of bonus payments to test the life 
cycle/permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH). 
In contrasting with a few earlier studies on the effect of large and predictable 
(regular) income movements, such as Browning and Collado (2001) and Hsieh (2003), 
we find evidence that the monthly pattern of household expenditure was significantly 
affected by the anticipated large change in the timing of income flows. In other words, 
Japanese public employee households did not smooth their expenditure in the face of an 
anticipated large change in the pattern of income, suggesting some deviation from the 
LC/PIH prediction.   
However, a closer look reveals that an excess sensitivity of expenditure is 
clearly observed only for expenditure subcategories of some durability, i.e., durables 
and semi-durables. Therefore, while the findings of this paper, i.e., the association 
between an anticipated change in the pattern of income and expenditure patterns, have 
important implications for policy-related issues, such as the magnitude of the fiscal 
multiplier, they do not rule out the possibility that Japanese households are smoothing 24 
 
the flow of services from durable expenditures, or that the LC/PIH holds good for 
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Table 1. Bonus payments to public employees in Japan
Summer Winter Spring Total
Standard date
of payment
30-Jun 10-Dec 15-Mar -
FY1997 2.20 2.60 0.55 5.35
FY1998 2.20 2.50 0.55 5.25
FY1999 2.20 2.25 0.50 4.95
FY2000 2.05 2.15 0.55 4.75
FY2001 2.05 2.10 0.55 4.70
FY2002 2.05 2.40 0.20 4.65
FY2003 2.25 2.15 0.00 4.40
FY2004 2.10 2.30 0.00 4.40
FY2005 2.10 2.35 0.00 4.45
FY2006 2.125 2.325 0.00 4.45
FY2007 2.125 2.375 0.00 4.50
FY2008 2.15 2.35 0.00 4.50
Source: National Personnel Authority.
Notes: The Japanese fiscal year runs from April to March.  
The figures in the table are the sum of the end-of-term allowance (kimatsu teate)
and the diligence allowance (kinben teate) relative to monthly regular income.28 
 
 
Table 2. Ratio of bonus income (relative to monthly household head regular income) and share of bonus recipients: Public vs. private sector workers













(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i)+(ii)+(iii)+(iv)
3,846 0.28 63% 0.45 3,727 1.36 69% 1.98 3,892 0.31 15% 2.06 3,864 1.94 86% 2.25 3.89
( 0.24 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.98 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 1.27 ) ( 2.68 ) ( 1.28 ) ( 1.09 )
6,158 0.03 5% 0.59 6,188 0.82 36% 2.28 6,415 0.59 31% 1.90 6,253 1.62 74% 2.18 3.05
( 0.17 ) ( 0.45 ) ( 4.35 ) ( 7.04 ) ( 1.02 ) ( 0.93 ) ( 1.37 ) ( 1.14 )
3,498 0.01 3% 0.25 3,432 1.22 62% 1.96 3,534 0.29 15% 1.91 3,562 1.77 84% 2.12 3.29
( 0.05 ) ( 0.15 ) ( 1.02 ) ( 0.48 ) ( 0.71 ) ( 0.52 ) ( 1.25 ) ( 1.07 )
5,401 0.02 2% 0.88 5,262 0.67 33% 2.04 5,364 0.52 29% 1.77 5,396 1.28 67% 1.90 2.48
( 0.20 ) ( 1.03 ) ( 1.09 ) ( 0.91 ) ( 0.95 ) ( 0.95 ) ( 1.13 ) ( 0.85 )













(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i)+(ii)+(iii)+(iv)
1,131 0.45 100% 0.45 1,329 1.60 82% 1.95 1,473 0.32 17% 1.92 1,331 2.20 100% 2.20 4.57
( 0.13 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.82 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.74 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 1.16 ) ( 1.16 )
2,415 0.00 0% 2,338 1.05 49% 2.15 2,371 0.81 41% 1.95 2,344 2.21 100% 2.21 4.07
( 0.00 ) ( 1.21 ) ( 0.79 ) ( 1.17 ) ( 1.04 ) ( 1.15 ) ( 1.15 )
1,367 0.00 0% 1,329 1.33 69% 1.92 1,257 0.40 21% 1.93 1,381 2.07 100% 2.07 3.80
( 0.00 ) ( 0.95 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.80 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.75 ) ( 0.75 )
2,068 0.00 0% 2,004 0.99 47% 2.09 1,804 0.71 39% 1.82 1,874 1.97 100% 1.97 3.67































































































Table 3. Sample statistics
Full sample: Jul 1997 to Jun 2008 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly disposable income  556 518 608 594 524 462 530 470 545 479 521 464
Household head regular monthly income 445 184 455 162 438 196 466 171 474 154 461 180
Household head bonus income 123 358 143 357 111 357 156 403 164 375 151 419
Monthly consumption expenditure  314 253 323 261 307 247 307 236 310 237 306 235
   Monthly services expenditure 140 153 141 158 139 150 138 135 136 141 139 132
   Monthly non-durables expenditure 115 46 119 47 112 45 112 43 115 44 110 42
   Monthly semi-durables expenditure 35 49 37 52 34 47 34 43 35 43 34 44
   Monthly durables expenditure 24 150 26 154 22 147 23 149 24 147 23 150
Annual income in the previous year (before tax) 8,634 3,518 9,180 3,514 8,291 3,476 7,743 2,786 7,804 2,481 7,706 2,958
Age of the household head 45.0 9.7 45.5 9.4 44.7 9.8 42.4 9.2 43.1 9.0 42.0 9.3
Number of family members 3.5 1.1 3.6 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.6 1.1 3.5 1.0
Number of workers in the household 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Number of observations (Number of households) 258,328 ( 48,308 ) 99,651 ( 18,597 ) 158,677 ( 29,770 ) 97,131 ( 19,248 ） 37,040 ( 7,315 ) 60,091 ( 11,947 )
Pre-reform: Jul 1997 to Jun 2002 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly disposable income  573 549 629 620 539 497 545 504 572 528 531 490
Household head regular monthly income 450 182 462 162 443 192 469 171 484 152 461 181
Household head bonus income 131 369 152 367 118 369 162 413 178 386 154 427
   of which in March 61 115 136 124 14 79 69 110 216 78 0 0
   of which in June 472 580 646 496 367 601 604 603 760 441 515 662
   of which in July 213 439 140 357 258 477 285 503 159 381 362 551
   of which in December 800 601 909 484 734 653 1,036 516 1,046 322 1,030 598
Monthly consumption expenditure  317 258 328 270 310 251 310 237 316 239 306 236
   Monthly services expenditure 137 157 139 162 136 154 134 137 134 138 135 137
   Monthly non-durables expenditure 117 47 121 47 115 46 114 44 119 44 112 44
   Monthly semi-durables expenditure 37 50 40 54 36 48 36 43 38 43 35 43
   Monthly durables expenditure 25 154 28 164 23 148 24 150 26 152 23 148
Annual income in the previous year (before tax) 8,866 3,599 9,403 3,591 8,538 3,565 7,879 2,819 7,991 2,464 7,816 2,996
Age of the household head 44.6 9.8 45.0 9.5 44.4 9.9 41.9 9.2 42.4 8.8 41.7 9.4
Number of family members 3.6 1.1 3.6 1.2 3.5 1.1 3.6 1.1 3.6 1.1 3.5 1.0
Number of workers in the household 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Number of observations (Number of households) 123,685 ( 23,982 ) 46,895 ( 9,108 ) 76,790 ( 14,892 ) 46,198 ( 9,429 ) 16,496 ( 3,386 ) 29,702 ( 6,044 )
Post-Reform:  from Jul 2003 to Jun 2008 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly disposable income  533 481 577 555 504 423 508 426 514 412 504 436
Household head regular monthly income 438 185 446 161 433 199 463 169 464 154 462 179
Household head bonus income 110 337 127 339 99 336 142 384 145 358 140 402
   of which in March 7 82 3 23 9 103 0 0 0 0 0 0
   of which in June 416 565 558 490 324 590 538 610 608 466 491 684
   of which in July 190 420 135 341 225 461 272 493 190 399 329 542
   of which in December 674 559 805 465 588 597 938 455 955 322 925 532
Monthly consumption expenditure  311 249 319 253 306 246 305 234 304 233 306 235
   Monthly services expenditure 143 150 144 154 143 148 142 134 138 140 144 128
   Monthly non-durables expenditure 113 45 117 46 110 43 109 42 112 44 107 40
   Monthly semi-durables expenditure 33 48 34 49 32 47 32 42 31 42 33 44
   Monthly durables expenditure 22 147 24 145 22 148 22 143 22 140 22 153
Annual income in the previous year (before tax) 8,390 3,417 8,926 3,422 8,043 3,369 7,588 2,667 7,594 2,479 7,585 2,883
Age of the household head 45.5 9.6 46.1 9.4 45.1 9.7 43.0 9.0 43.7 9.2 42.6 9.2
Number of family members 3.5 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.5 1.0 3.5 1.1 3.5 1.0
Number of workers in the household 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Number of observations (Number of households) 109,426 ( 21,290 ) 43,038 ( 8,349 ) 66,388 ( 12,975 ) 41,172 ( 8,375 ) 16,656 ( 3,344 ) 24,516 ( 5,042 )
(a)  All wage earning white-collar worker households
(Broadly-defined sample)
(b)  Male sole white-collar wage earner head
households with bonus receipts in the regular bonus
months (Narrowly-defined sample)
Public & Private Public Private Public & Private Public Private30 
 
 
Table 4.    OLS coefficient estimates for regression model (1) and derived monthly patterns 
(a) All wage earning public sector worker households (Broadly-defined sample) 
Derived monthly patterns for Figures 1, 2, and 3 
WHH  DI  C  SC  NDC  SDC  DC 
Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Figure no.  1.1-(a)  1.2-(a)  2.1-(a)  3.1-(a)  3.2-(a)  3.3-(a)  3.4-(a) 
Pre-reform 
Jan dummy  a  0-1  -1.01  ( 0.008  ) 
***  -1.17  (  0.011  ) 
***  -0.29  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.19  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.25  (  0.007  ) 
***  -0.62  ( 0.111  ) 
***  -0.58  ( 0.133  ) 
***  Jan  a  1  (=  a  0  +  a  0-1)  -1.00  -1.09  -0.28  -0.18  -0.29  -0.41  -0.29 
Feb dummy  a  0-2  0.09  ( 0.004  ) 
***  0.07  (  0.010  ) 
***  0.01  (  0.013  )  0.00  (  0.018  )  0.12  (  0.007  ) 
***  -0.44  ( 0.057  ) 
***  -0.25  ( 0.138  ) 
*  Feb  a  2  (=  a  0  +  a  0-2)  0.10  0.15  0.02  0.01  0.08  -0.23  0.04 
Mar dummy  a  0-3  0.13  ( 0.005  ) 
***  0.02  (  0.011  ) 
*  0.09  (  0.013  ) 
***  0.07  (  0.019  ) 
***  0.02  (  0.007  ) 
**  0.14  ( 0.044  ) 
***  -0.03  ( 0.140  )  Mar  a  3  (=  a  0+  a  0-3)  0.14  0.10  0.10  0.08  -0.02  0.35  0.27 
Apr dummy  a  0-4  -0.21  ( 0.005  ) 
***  -0.26  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.05  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.02  (  0.020  )  0.01  (  0.007  )  -0.34  ( 0.051  ) 
***  -0.54  ( 0.139  ) 
***  Apr  a  4  (=  a  0  +  a  0-4  )  -0.20  -0.18  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.13  -0.25 
May dummy  a  0-5  -0.05  ( 0.004  ) 
***  -0.26  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.09  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.10  (  0.019  ) 
***  0.01  (  0.006  )  -0.29  ( 0.033  ) 
***  -0.46  ( 0.138  ) 
***  May  a  5  (=  a  0  +  a  0-5  )  -0.04  -0.18  -0.08  -0.09  -0.03  -0.08  -0.16 
Jun dummy  a  0-6  0.78  ( 0.010  ) 
***  0.88  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.03  (  0.013  ) 
**  -0.05  (  0.018  ) 
***  0.01  (  0.007  )  -0.23  ( 0.036  ) 
***  -0.07  ( 0.138  )  Jun  a  6  (=  a  0  +  a  0-6  )  0.79  0.95  -0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  0.23 
Jul dummy  a  0-7  -0.60  ( 0.015  ) 
***  -0.72  (  0.018  ) 
***  0.09  (  0.014  ) 
***  0.09  (  0.019  ) 
***  0.07  (  0.007  ) 
***  0.00  ( 0.074  )  0.00  ( 0.140  )  Jul  a  7  (=  a  0  +  a  0-7  )  -0.59  -0.65  0.10  0.11  0.03  0.21  0.30 
Aug dummy  a  0-8  -0.16  ( 0.008  ) 
***  -0.15  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.07  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.02  (  0.020  )  0.04  (  0.007  ) 
***  -0.57  ( 0.059  ) 
***  -0.80  ( 0.138  ) 
***  Aug  a  8  (=  a  0  +  a  0-8  )  -0.15  -0.08  -0.06  -0.01  0.00  -0.36  -0.51 
Sep dummy  a  0-9  0.01  ( 0.004  ) 
***  -0.12  (  0.010  ) 
***  -0.09  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.14  (  0.020  ) 
***  -0.01  (  0.007  ) 
*  -0.32  ( 0.076  ) 
***  -0.30  ( 0.141  ) 
**  Sep  a  9  (=  a  0  +  a  0-9  )  0.02  -0.05  -0.08  -0.13  -0.05  -0.11  -0.01 
Oct  a  10  (=  a  0  )  0.01  0.07  0.01  0.01  -0.04  0.21  0.29 
Nov dummy  a  0-11  0.00  ( 0.004  )  -0.12  (  0.010  ) 
***  -0.02  (  0.014  )  -0.02  (  0.019  )  0.04  (  0.007  ) 
***  -0.17  ( 0.035  ) 
***  -0.17  ( 0.134  )  Nov  a  11  (=  a  0  +  a  0-11 )  0.01  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.04  0.12 
Dec dummy  a  0-12  0.97  ( 0.008  ) 
***  1.02  (  0.011  ) 
***  0.25  (  0.013  ) 
***  0.11  (  0.019  ) 
***  0.30  (  0.007  ) 
***  0.28  ( 0.040  ) 
***  0.17  ( 0.126  )  Dec  a  12  (=  a  0  +  a  0-12 )  0.98  1.09  0.25  0.12  0.26  0.49  0.46 
Post-reform 
Jan dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  1  0.06  ( 0.012  ) 
***  0.14  (  0.013  ) 
***  0.09  (  0.012  ) 
***  0.04  (  0.018  ) 
**  0.08  (  0.008  ) 
***  0.16  ( 0.033  ) 
***  0.04  ( 0.117  )  Jan  -0.94  -0.95  -0.19  -0.14  -0.21  -0.25  -0.24 
Feb dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  2  -0.01  ( 0.004  ) 
**  -0.01  (  0.011  )  -0.02  (  0.012  )  0.00  (  0.017  )  -0.02  (  0.006  ) 
***  -0.09  ( 0.036  ) 
**  -0.02  ( 0.134  )  Feb  0.09  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.07  -0.32  0.02 
Mar dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  3  -0.23  ( 0.005  ) 
***  -0.24  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.05  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.05  (  0.019  ) 
**  -0.01  (  0.007  ) 
*  -0.13  ( 0.039  ) 
***  -0.22  ( 0.136  )  Mar  -0.09  -0.15  0.04  0.03  -0.03  0.21  0.05 
Apr dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  4  0.23  ( 0.006  ) 
***  0.24  (  0.013  ) 
***  0.02  (  0.014  )  0.01  (  0.021  )  0.00  (  0.007  )  0.07  ( 0.036  ) 
**  0.35  ( 0.136  ) 
**  Apr  0.03  0.06  -0.02  0.00  -0.03  -0.05  0.10 
May dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  5  -0.01  ( 0.004  )  0.00  (  0.013  )  0.01  (  0.013  )  0.00  (  0.020  )  -0.01  (  0.006  )  0.06  ( 0.034  ) 
*  -0.07  ( 0.135  )  May  -0.05  -0.19  -0.07  -0.09  -0.03  -0.02  -0.24 
Jun dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  6  -0.08  ( 0.014  ) 
***  -0.12  (  0.016  ) 
***  -0.02  (  0.012  ) 
*  -0.02  (  0.018  )  -0.01  (  0.007  )  0.01  ( 0.032  )  -0.12  ( 0.137  )  Jun  0.71  0.83  -0.04  -0.06  -0.04  -0.01  0.11 
Jul dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  7  0.07  ( 0.022  ) 
***  0.12  (  0.024  ) 
***  -0.04  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.06  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.01  (  0.007  )  -0.11  ( 0.032  ) 
***  -0.14  ( 0.135  )  Jul  -0.52  -0.53  0.06  0.04  0.02  0.10  0.15 
Aug dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  8  0.00  ( 0.011  )  -0.01  (  0.014  )  0.02  (  0.013  )  0.03  (  0.020  ) 
*  0.01  (  0.007  )  0.07  ( 0.033  ) 
**  -0.10  ( 0.129  )  Aug  -0.15  -0.09  -0.04  0.02  0.01  -0.29  -0.61 
Sep dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  9  -0.01  ( 0.004  ) 
***  0.01  (  0.010  )  0.03  (  0.012  ) 
**  0.03  (  0.020  )  0.01  (  0.007  ) 
*  -0.03  ( 0.034  )  0.24  ( 0.136  ) 
*  Sep  0.01  -0.04  -0.05  -0.10  -0.04  -0.14  0.23 
Oct dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  10  -0.01  ( 0.005  ) 
**  -0.01  (  0.010  )  -0.01  (  0.013  )  -0.03  (  0.019  ) 
*  0.01  (  0.007  ) 
*  -0.05  ( 0.034  )  -0.18  ( 0.140  )  Oct  0.00  0.07  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.16  0.12 
Nov dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  11  0.01  ( 0.005  )  0.01  (  0.010  )  0.00  (  0.012  )  -0.01  (  0.019  )  0.00  (  0.007  )  0.08  ( 0.034  ) 
**  -0.12  ( 0.129  )  Nov  0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.12  0.00 
Dec dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  12  -0.07  ( 0.011  ) 
***  -0.15  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.07  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.05  (  0.019  ) 
**  -0.04  (  0.007  ) 
***  -0.13  ( 0.032  ) 
***  0.01  ( 0.114  )  Dec  0.90  0.94  0.19  0.07  0.23  0.37  0.47 
Constant  a  0  0.01  (  0.00  ) 
***  0.07  (  0.007  ) 
***  0.01  (  0.009  )  0.01  (  0.01  )  -0.04  (  0.005  ) 
***  0.21  ( 0.027  ) 
***  0.29  ( 0.105  ) 
*** 
F test:   b  m=0 for all months.  F( 12, 71932) = 306.74  ***  F( 12, 72099) = 89.91  ***  F( 12, 73546) = 10.33  ***  F( 12, 73483) = 3.14  ***  F( 12, 73546) = 13.27  ***  F( 12, 71361) = 7.33  ***  F( 12, 17501) = 1.50 
R-squared 
Root MSE 
Number of observations 
(b) Sole wage earner public employees who reported bonus receipts in the regular bonus months (Narrowly-defined sample) 
Derived monthly patterns for Figures 1, 2, and 3 
WHH  DI  C  SC  NDC  SDC  DC 
Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Figure no.  1.1-(b)  1.2-(b)  2.1-(b)  3.1-(b)  3.2-(b)  3.3-(b)  3.4-(b) 
Pre-reform 
Jan dummy  a  0-1  -1.16  ( 0.006  ) 
***  -1.28  (  0.012  ) 
***  -0.28  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.21  (  0.029  ) 
***  -0.23  (  0.011  ) 
***  -0.63  ( 0.175  ) 
***  -0.59  ( 0.219  ) 
***  Jan  a  1  (=  a  0  +  a  0-1)  -1.13  -1.22  -0.26  -0.17  -0.25  -0.39  -0.23 
Feb dummy  a  0-2  0.07  ( 0.005  ) 
***  0.04  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.01  (  0.020  )  0.00  (  0.028  )  0.10  (  0.011  ) 
***  -0.52  ( 0.089  ) 
***  -0.36  ( 0.231  )  Feb  a  2  (=  a  0  +  a  0-2)  0.10  0.11  0.02  0.04  0.08  -0.28  0.00 
Mar dummy  a  0-3  0.24  ( 0.006  ) 
***  0.22  (  0.014  ) 
***  0.09  (  0.020  ) 
***  0.06  (  0.029  ) 
**  0.01  (  0.011  )  0.16  ( 0.069  ) 
**  -0.07  ( 0.231  )  Mar  a  3  (=  a  0+  a  0-3)  0.27  0.28  0.11  0.10  -0.02  0.40  0.29 
Apr dummy  a  0-4  -0.35  ( 0.006  ) 
***  -0.44  (  0.016  ) 
***  -0.07  (  0.021  ) 
***  -0.06  (  0.030  ) 
**  0.01  (  0.011  )  -0.28  ( 0.080  ) 
***  -0.54  ( 0.228  ) 
**  Apr  a  4  (=  a  0  +  a  0-4  )  -0.33  -0.38  -0.05  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.19 
May dummy  a  0-5  -0.07  ( 0.006  ) 
***  -0.21  (  0.018  ) 
***  -0.10  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.12  (  0.028  ) 
***  0.00  (  0.010  )  -0.36  ( 0.051  ) 
***  -0.54  ( 0.220  ) 
**  May  a  5  (=  a  0  +  a  0-5  )  -0.04  -0.15  -0.07  -0.08  -0.03  -0.12  -0.18 
Jun dummy  a  0-6  0.90  ( 0.014  ) 
***  1.01  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.05  (  0.019  ) 
**  -0.06  (  0.027  ) 
**  0.00  (  0.011  )  -0.28  ( 0.056  ) 
***  -0.09  ( 0.231  )  Jun  a  6  (=  a  0  +  a  0-6  )  0.93  1.08  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  0.26 
Jul dummy  a  0-7  -0.72  ( 0.026  ) 
***  -0.82  (  0.030  ) 
***  0.09  (  0.021  ) 
***  0.08  (  0.028  ) 
***  0.06  (  0.011  ) 
***  0.01  ( 0.115  )  0.15  ( 0.226  )  Jul  a  7  (=  a  0  +  a  0-7  )  -0.70  -0.76  0.11  0.12  0.03  0.25  0.50 
Aug dummy  a  0-8  -0.20  ( 0.013  ) 
***  -0.20  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.11  (  0.019  ) 
***  -0.06  (  0.030  ) 
**  0.00  (  0.010  )  -0.74  ( 0.091  ) 
***  -1.03  ( 0.215  ) 
***  Aug  a  8  (=  a  0  +  a  0-8  )  -0.18  -0.13  -0.09  -0.03  -0.03  -0.50  -0.68 
Sep dummy  a  0-9  0.00  ( 0.005  )  -0.08  (  0.013  ) 
***  -0.09  (  0.018  ) 
***  -0.15  (  0.029  ) 
***  -0.01  (  0.010  )  -0.28  ( 0.118  ) 
**  -0.28  ( 0.223  )  Sep  a  9  (=  a  0  +  a  0-9  )  0.02  -0.02  -0.06  -0.11  -0.03  -0.04  0.07 
Oct  a  10  (=  a  0  )  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.24  0.35 
Nov dummy  a  0-11  -0.02  ( 0.006  ) 
***  -0.08  (  0.014  ) 
***  -0.03  (  0.02  )  -0.03  (  0.028  )  0.04  (  0.011  ) 
***  -0.22  ( 0.054  ) 
***  -0.05  ( 0.208  )  Nov  a  11  (=  a  0  +  a  0-11 )  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.30 
Dec dummy  a  0-12  1.09  ( 0.006  ) 
***  1.17  (  0.012  ) 
***  0.21  (  0.02  ) 
***  0.08  (  0.028  ) 
***  0.26  (  0.011  ) 
***  0.24  ( 0.062  ) 
***  0.02  ( 0.203  )  Dec  a  12  (=  a  0  +  a  0-12 )  1.12  1.23  0.23  0.12  0.24  0.48  0.38 
Post-reform 
Jan dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  1  0.03  ( 0.007  ) 
***  0.11  (  0.010  ) 
***  0.07  (  0.019  ) 
***  0.02  (  0.028  )  0.06  (  0.012  ) 
***  0.12  ( 0.052  ) 
**  0.02  ( 0.192  )  Jan  -1.10  -1.11  -0.19  -0.15  -0.19  -0.26  -0.21 
Feb dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  2  0.00  ( 0.005  )  0.03  (  0.015  ) 
**  -0.01  (  0.018  )  0.00  (  0.027  )  -0.01  (  0.011  )  -0.04  ( 0.055  )  0.04  ( 0.225  )  Feb  0.10  0.14  0.01  0.03  0.07  -0.33  0.04 
Mar dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  3  -0.37  ( 0.006  ) 
***  -0.41  (  0.015  ) 
***  -0.08  (  0.021  ) 
***  -0.08  (  0.030  ) 
***  -0.01  (  0.011  )  -0.19  ( 0.062  ) 
***  -0.37  ( 0.229  )  Mar  -0.10  -0.13  0.03  0.01  -0.02  0.21  -0.08 
Apr dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  4  0.37  ( 0.007  ) 
***  0.41  (  0.018  ) 
***  0.04  (  0.023  ) 
*  0.04  (  0.032  )  -0.02  (  0.011  )  0.09  ( 0.058  )  0.25  ( 0.231  )  Apr  0.04  0.04  -0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.06  0.06 
May dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  5  -0.01  ( 0.006  )  -0.02  (  0.020  )  0.04  (  0.020  ) 
**  0.04  (  0.029  )  0.00  (  0.010  )  0.11  ( 0.053  ) 
**  0.23  ( 0.224  )  May  -0.05  -0.17  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  -0.01  0.04 
Jun dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  6  -0.14  ( 0.020  ) 
***  -0.17  (  0.024  ) 
***  0.00  (  0.020  )  -0.03  (  0.027  )  0.00  (  0.011  )  0.05  ( 0.050  )  0.15  ( 0.229  )  Jun  0.78  0.90  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  0.01  0.41 
Jul dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  7  0.14  ( 0.039  ) 
***  0.18  (  0.042  ) 
***  -0.08  (  0.020  ) 
***  -0.08  (  0.029  ) 
***  -0.02  (  0.011  ) 
**  -0.16  ( 0.049  ) 
***  -0.39  ( 0.214  ) 
*  Jul  -0.56  -0.58  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.09  0.11 
Aug dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  8  -0.04  ( 0.018  ) 
**  -0.04  (  0.023  ) 
*  0.06  (  0.020  ) 
***  0.07  (  0.031  ) 
**  0.02  (  0.011  ) 
*  0.13  ( 0.052  ) 
**  0.17  ( 0.200  )  Aug  -0.21  -0.18  -0.03  0.05  -0.01  -0.37  -0.51 
Sep dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  9  -0.01  ( 0.005  ) 
*  0.02  (  0.013  )  0.00  (  0.019  )  0.01  (  0.030  )  0.00  (  0.010  )  -0.04  ( 0.052  )  0.09  ( 0.216  )  Sep  0.02  0.00  -0.06  -0.10  -0.03  -0.09  0.17 
Oct dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  10  -0.01  ( 0.006  ) 
**  -0.01  (  0.013  )  -0.01  (  0.018  )  -0.04  (  0.028  )  0.00  (  0.010  )  -0.04  ( 0.052  )  -0.36  ( 0.223  )  Oct  0.01  0.05  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.20  0.00 
Nov dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  11  0.02  ( 0.007  ) 
**  0.01  (  0.013  )  0.00  (  0.018  )  -0.03  (  0.028  )  0.00  (  0.010  )  0.08  ( 0.052  )  -0.20  ( 0.191  )  Nov  0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.10  0.11 
Dec dummy x Post-reform dummy  b  12  -0.04  ( 0.007  ) 
***  -0.13  (  0.010  ) 
***  -0.03  (  0.018  ) 
*  -0.04  (  0.028  )  -0.02  (  0.012  ) 
*  -0.08  ( 0.051  )  0.09  ( 0.184  )  Dec  1.08  1.10  0.20  0.08  0.22  0.40  0.47 
Constant  a  0  0.02  (  0.00  ) 
***  0.06  (  0.010  ) 
***  0.02  (  0.013  ) 
*  0.03  (  0.020  ) 
*  -0.03  (  0.007  ) 
***  0.24  ( 0.042  ) 
***  0.35  ( 0.167  ) 
** 
F test:   b  m=0 for all months.  F( 12, 26368) = 570.68  ***  F( 12, 26359) = 140.16  ***  F( 12, 26887) = 5.09  ***  F( 12, 26880) = 2.65  ***  F( 12, 26887) = 3.23  ***  F( 12, 26328) = 3.84  ***  F( 12, 6513) = 1.12 
R-squared 
Root MSE 
Number of observations 
Note: All regressions are estimated by OLS and include the nominal interest rate and relative price changes as control variables. Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
26,354  6,539  26,392  26,383  26,913  26,906  26,913 
0.0423  0.0151 
0.3428  0.4632  0.4595  0.6774  0.2561  1.2329  2.4625 
0.7245  0.6260  0.0473  0.0120  0.1287 
a  8  +  b  8 
a  9  +  b  9 
a  10  +  b  10 
a  11  +  b  11 
a  12  +  b  12 
a  1  +  b  1 
a  2  +  b  2 
a  3  +b 3 
a  4  +  b  4 
a  5  +b 5 
















a  7  +  b  7 
71,387 
   
17,527 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
71,956  72,123  73,572  73,509  73,572 
(6)  (7) 
0.0340  0.013 
0.390  0.534  0.487  0.7368  0.2655  1.2988  2.4987 
0.602  0.495  0.046  0.0098  0.1405 
a  7  +  b  7 
a  8  +  b  8 
a  9  +  b  9 
a  10  +  b  10 
a  11  +  b  11 
a  12  +  b  12 
a  1  +  b  1 
a  2  +  b  2 
a  3  +b 3 
a  4  +  b  4 
a  5  +b 5 
a  6  +  b  6 
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Table 5.    OLS coefficient estimates f  or r  egression model (2) and derived   monthly    patterns 
(a) All wage earning white-collar worker households (Broadly-defined sample) 
Derived monthly patterns for Figures 4, 5, and 6 
WHH  DI  C  SC  NDC  SDC  DC 
Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Figure no.  4.1-(a)  4.2-(a)  5.1-(a)  6.1-(a)  6.2-(a)  6.3-(a)  6.4-(a) 
Pre-reform 
Jan dummy  a  0-1  -0.80 ( 0.008 )  ***  -0.93 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.22 (  0.010 )  ***  -0.11 (  0.015 )  ***  -0.23 (  0.006 )  ***  -0.43 ( 0.071 )  ***  -0.46 ( 0.102 )  ***  Jan  a  1 (=  a  0  +  a  0-1)  -0.83  -0.89  -0.24  -0.13  -0.27  -0.27  -0.38 
Feb dummy  a  0-2  0.12 ( 0.003 )  ***  0.09 (  0.007 )  ***  0.03 (  0.010 )  ***  0.02 (  0.014 )  0.13 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.38 ( 0.039 )  ***  -0.07 ( 0.108 )  Feb  a  2 (=  a  0  +  a  0-2)  0.09  0.12  0.02  -0.01  0.09  -0.23  0.01 
Mar dummy  a  0-3  -0.04 ( 0.003 )  ***  -0.11 (  0.008 )  ***  0.07 (  0.010 )  ***  0.08 (  0.015 )  ***  0.02 (  0.005 )  ***  0.08 ( 0.033 )  **  -0.06 ( 0.114 )  Mar  a  3 (=  a  0+  a  0-3)  -0.07  -0.08  0.05  0.05  -0.02  0.24  0.03 
Apr dummy  a  0-4  0.05 ( 0.004 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.008 )  **  0.01 (  0.010 )  0.05 (  0.016 )  ***  0.01 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.28 ( 0.036 )  ***  -0.04 ( 0.108 )  Apr  a  4 (=  a  0  +  a  0-4  )  0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.02  -0.03  -0.12  0.05 
May dummy  a  0-5  -0.01 ( 0.003 )  ***  -0.17 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.015 )  **  0.01 (  0.005 )  **  -0.23 ( 0.026 )  ***  -0.27 ( 0.105 )  ***  May  a  5 (=  a  0  +  a  0-5  )  -0.04  -0.14  -0.07  -0.06  -0.03  -0.08  -0.19 
Jun dummy  a  0-6  0.45 ( 0.008 )  ***  0.52 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.04 (  0.014 )  ***  0.02 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.17 ( 0.027 )  ***  0.15 ( 0.110 )  Jun  a  6 (=  a  0  +  a  0-6  )  0.43  0.55  -0.03  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01  0.24 
Jul dummy  a  0-7  -0.09 ( 0.013 )  ***  -0.20 (  0.015 )  ***  0.08 (  0.010 )  ***  0.09 (  0.014 )  ***  0.06 (  0.005 )  ***  0.05 ( 0.049 )  0.03 ( 0.106 )  Jul  a  7 (=  a  0  +  a  0-7  )  -0.12  -0.16  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.21  0.11 
Aug dummy  a  0-8  -0.27 ( 0.008 )  ***  -0.27 (  0.010 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.009 )  ***  0.01 (  0.015 )  0.04 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.52 ( 0.040 )  ***  -0.50 ( 0.105 )  ***  Aug  a  8 (=  a  0  +  a  0-8  )  -0.29  -0.23  -0.06  -0.01  0.00  -0.36  -0.42 
Sep dummy  a  0-9  0.04 ( 0.004 )  ***  -0.07 (  0.008 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.015 )  ***  0.01 (  0.005 )  **  -0.32 ( 0.050 )  ***  -0.08 ( 0.109 )  Sep  a  9 (=  a  0  +  a  0-9  )  0.02  -0.04  -0.04  -0.07  -0.03  -0.17  0.00 
Oct  a  10  (=  a  0  )  -0.03  0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  0.16  0.08 
Nov dummy  a  0-11  0.06 ( 0.003 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.007 )  ***  0.03 (  0.010 )  ***  0.02 (  0.015 )  *  0.06 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.11 ( 0.027 )  ***  0.06 ( 0.106 )  Nov  a  11 (=  a  0  +  a  0-11  )  0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.14 
Dec dummy  a  0-12  0.83 ( 0.008 )  ***  0.86 (  0.010 )  ***  0.20 (  0.010 )  ***  0.08 (  0.015 )  ***  0.28 (  0.005 )  ***  0.26 ( 0.029 )  ***  0.20 ( 0.101 )  **  Dec  a  12 (=  a  0  +  a  0-12  )  0.80  0.89  0.19  0.06  0.24  0.42  0.28 
Pre-reform & Public 
Jan dummy x Public dummy  b  1  -0.17 ( 0.011 )  ***  -0.20 (  0.013 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.017 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.007 )  **  -0.04 ( 0.029 )  0.08 ( 0.106 )  Jan  -1.00  -1.09  -0.28  -0.18  -0.29  -0.31  -0.30 
Feb dummy x Public dummy  b  2  0.01 ( 0.004 )  **  0.03 (  0.009 )  ***  0.00 (  0.010 )  0.01 (  0.016 )  0.00 (  0.006 )  0.03 ( 0.032 )  0.03 ( 0.121 )  Feb  0.10  0.15  0.02  0.01  0.08  -0.20  0.04 
Mar dummy x Public dummy  b  3  0.20 ( 0.005 )  ***  0.18 (  0.010 )  ***  0.05 (  0.011 )  ***  0.02 (  0.017 )  0.00 (  0.006 )  0.07 ( 0.033 )  **  0.24 ( 0.128 )  *  Mar  0.14  0.10  0.09  0.08  -0.02  0.31  0.27 
Apr dummy x Public dummy  b  4  -0.22 ( 0.006 )  ***  -0.20 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.012 )  **  -0.03 (  0.019 )  *  0.00 (  0.006 )  -0.06 ( 0.030 )  *  -0.30 ( 0.120 )  **  Apr  -0.20  -0.18  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.18  -0.25 
May dummy x Public dummy  b  5  0.00 ( 0.004 )  -0.04 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.011 )  -0.03 (  0.017 )  *  0.00 (  0.006 )  -0.01 ( 0.029 )  0.03 ( 0.118 )  May  -0.04  -0.18  -0.08  -0.09  -0.03  -0.09  -0.16 
Jun dummy x Public dummy  b  6  0.36 ( 0.013 )  ***  0.40 (  0.015 )  ***  0.01 (  0.010 )  0.02 (  0.016 )  0.00 (  0.006 )  0.00 ( 0.028 )  -0.01 ( 0.122 )  Jun  0.79  0.95  -0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  0.23 
Jul dummy x Public dummy  b  7  -0.47 ( 0.020 )  ***  -0.49 (  0.022 )  ***  0.04 (  0.011 )  ***  0.04 (  0.017 )  **  0.01 (  0.006 )  *  0.05 ( 0.028 )  *  0.18 ( 0.122 )  Jul  -0.59  -0.65  0.10  0.10  0.03  0.26  0.29 
Aug dummy x Public dummy  b  8  0.14 ( 0.011 )  ***  0.15 (  0.014 )  ***  0.00 (  0.011 )  0.00 (  0.018 )  0.01 (  0.006 )  0.03 ( 0.029 )  -0.10 ( 0.119 )  Aug  -0.15  -0.08  -0.06  -0.01  0.00  -0.33  -0.51 
Sep dummy x Public dummy  b  9  0.01 ( 0.004 )  **  -0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.04 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.017 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.006 )  ***  -0.03 ( 0.030 )  -0.01 ( 0.125 )  Sep  0.02  -0.05  -0.08  -0.13  -0.05  -0.20  -0.01 
Oct dummy x Public dummy  b  10  0.04 ( 0.004 )  ***  0.04 (  0.009 )  ***  0.03 (  0.011 )  **  0.03 (  0.017 )  *  0.01 (  0.006 )  0.04 ( 0.030 )  0.21 ( 0.126 )  *  Oct  0.01  0.07  0.01  0.01  -0.04  0.20  0.29 
Nov dummy x Public dummy  b  11  -0.02 ( 0.004 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.011 )  *  -0.01 (  0.016 )  -0.01 (  0.006 )  -0.01 ( 0.029 )  -0.03 ( 0.114 )  Nov  0.01  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.04  0.12 
Dec dummy x Public dummy  b  12  0.18 ( 0.011 )  ***  0.20 (  0.012 )  ***  0.07 (  0.011 )  ***  0.06 (  0.017 )  ***  0.03 (  0.007 )  ***  0.08 ( 0.028 )  ***  0.17 ( 0.101 )  *  Dec  0.98  1.09  0.25  0.12  0.26  0.50  0.46 
Post-reform 
Jan dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  1  0.13 ( 0.012 )  ***  0.18 (  0.013 )  ***  0.10 (  0.009 )  ***  0.06 (  0.014 )  ***  0.09 (  0.006 )  ***  0.17 ( 0.027 )  ***  0.19 ( 0.094 )  **  Jan  -0.69  -0.71  -0.14  -0.07  -0.18  -0.10  -0.18 
Feb dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  2  -0.01 ( 0.004 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.008 )  -0.01 (  0.009 )  0.01 (  0.014 )  -0.02 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.05 ( 0.029 )  *  0.06 ( 0.108 )  Feb  0.08  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.07  -0.28  0.07 
Mar dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  3  -0.01 ( 0.004 )  **  -0.02 (  0.008 )  **  -0.04 (  0.010 )  ***  -0.07 (  0.015 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.06 ( 0.030 )  *  0.06 ( 0.119 )  Mar  -0.07  -0.10  0.01  -0.01  -0.04  0.18  0.09 
Apr dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  4  0.01 ( 0.005 )  *  0.03 (  0.009 )  ***  0.03 (  0.011 )  **  0.02 (  0.016 )  0.01 (  0.005 )  **  0.07 ( 0.028 )  **  -0.04 ( 0.109 )  Apr  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.05  -0.02  -0.05  0.01 
May dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  5  -0.01 ( 0.004 )  -0.01 (  0.010 )  -0.02 (  0.010 )  -0.03 (  0.015 )  **  0.00 (  0.005 )  0.02 ( 0.026 )  0.07 ( 0.108 )  May  -0.04  -0.15  -0.08  -0.09  -0.03  -0.05  -0.12 
Jun dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  6  -0.05 ( 0.012 )  ***  -0.07 (  0.013 )  ***  0.01 (  0.009 )  0.01 (  0.013 )  0.00 (  0.005 )  0.01 ( 0.026 )  -0.16 ( 0.112 )  Jun  0.38  0.49  -0.02  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01  0.08 
Jul dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  7  0.02 ( 0.018 )  0.04 (  0.020 )  **  -0.04 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.014 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.06 ( 0.025 )  **  -0.07 ( 0.107 )  Jul  -0.10  -0.12  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.15  0.05 
Aug dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  8  0.03 ( 0.011 )  ***  0.04 (  0.013 )  ***  0.04 (  0.010 )  ***  0.05 (  0.014 )  ***  0.02 (  0.006 )  ***  0.12 ( 0.026 )  ***  0.16 ( 0.107 )  Aug  -0.26  -0.20  -0.01  0.03  0.01  -0.24  -0.25 
Sep dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  9  0.00 ( 0.004 )  0.02 (  0.008 )  ***  0.01 (  0.010 )  0.02 (  0.015 )  0.01 (  0.005 )  *  -0.03 ( 0.027 )  0.16 ( 0.111 )  Sep  0.02  -0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.20  0.16 
Oct dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  10  0.00 ( 0.004 )  -0.01 (  0.008 )  *  0.01 (  0.010 )  -0.01 (  0.015 )  0.01 (  0.005 )  **  0.04 ( 0.027 )  0.08 ( 0.111 )  Oct  -0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.20  0.16 
Nov dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  11  0.00 ( 0.004 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  -0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.02 (  0.014 )  0.00 (  0.005 )  -0.02 ( 0.026 )  -0.06 ( 0.104 )  Nov  0.03  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.02  0.08 
Dec dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  12  -0.13 ( 0.012 )  ***  -0.19 (  0.012 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.014 )  **  -0.05 (  0.006 )  ***  -0.10 ( 0.026 )  ***  -0.06 ( 0.096 )  Dec  0.66  0.70  0.14  0.03  0.19  0.32  0.22 
Post-reform & Public 
Jan dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  1  -0.07 ( 0.017 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.019 )  **  -0.01 (  0.015 )  -0.02 (  0.023 )  -0.01 (  0.010 )  -0.01 ( 0.043 )  -0.15 ( 0.150 )  Jan  -0.94  -0.95  -0.19  -0.14  -0.21  -0.16  -0.25 
Feb dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  2  0.00 ( 0.006 )  0.00 (  0.014 )  0.00 (  0.015 )  -0.01 (  0.022 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  -0.04 ( 0.046 )  -0.08 ( 0.172 )  Feb  0.09  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.07  -0.29  0.02 
Mar dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  3  -0.22 ( 0.006 )  ***  -0.22 (  0.015 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.016 )  0.02 (  0.024 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  -0.09 ( 0.048 )  *  -0.29 ( 0.180 )  Mar  -0.09  -0.15  0.04  0.03  -0.03  0.16  0.04 
Apr dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  4  0.22 ( 0.008 )  ***  0.21 (  0.016 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.018 )  -0.01 (  0.026 )  -0.01 (  0.008 )  *  0.01 ( 0.045 )  0.38 ( 0.174 )  **  Apr  0.03  0.06  -0.02  0.00  -0.03  -0.10  0.09 
May dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  5  0.00 ( 0.006 )  0.01 (  0.017 )  0.02 (  0.016 )  0.03 (  0.025 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  0.03 ( 0.042 )  -0.14 ( 0.173 )  May  -0.05  -0.19  -0.07  -0.09  -0.03  -0.03  -0.24 
Jun dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  6  -0.04 ( 0.018 )  *  -0.05 (  0.021 )  **  -0.03 (  0.015 )  **  -0.04 (  0.022 )  -0.01 (  0.008 )  0.00 ( 0.041 )  0.04 ( 0.176 )  Jun  0.71  0.83  -0.04  -0.06  -0.04  -0.01  0.11 
Jul dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  7  0.05 ( 0.029 )  *  0.07 (  0.031 )  **  0.00 (  0.015 )  -0.02 (  0.023 )  0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.05 ( 0.040 )  -0.07 ( 0.172 )  Jul  -0.52  -0.53  0.06  0.04  0.02  0.15  0.15 
Aug dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  8  -0.03 ( 0.015 )  *  -0.05 (  0.019 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.016 )  *  -0.02 (  0.024 )  -0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.06 ( 0.041 )  -0.26 ( 0.167 )  Aug  -0.15  -0.09  -0.04  0.02  0.01  -0.26  -0.61 
Sep dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  9  -0.01 ( 0.006 )  **  -0.01 (  0.013 )  0.02 (  0.016 )  0.02 (  0.024 )  0.00 (  0.009 )  0.00 ( 0.043 )  0.08 ( 0.175 )  Sep  0.01  -0.04  -0.05  -0.09  -0.04  -0.22  0.23 
Oct dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  10  -0.01 ( 0.006 )  0.01 (  0.013 )  -0.01 (  0.016 )  -0.02 (  0.024 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  -0.09 ( 0.043 )  **  -0.26 ( 0.179 )  Oct  0.00  0.07  0.00  -0.02  -0.03  0.15  0.12 
Nov dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  11  0.01 ( 0.006 )  0.00 (  0.013 )  0.01 (  0.015 )  0.00 (  0.023 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  0.10 ( 0.043 )  **  -0.05 ( 0.165 )  Nov  0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.11  0.00 
Dec dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  12  0.06 ( 0.016 )  ***  0.04 (  0.018 )  **  -0.02 (  0.015 )  -0.02 (  0.023 )  0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.03 ( 0.041 )  0.08 ( 0.148 )  Dec  0.90  0.94  0.19  0.07  0.23  0.37  0.47 
Constant  a  0  -0.03 ( 0.002 )  ***  0.03 (  0.005 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.007 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.029 )  **  -0.04 (  0.004 )  ***  0.16 ( 0.021 )  ***  0.08 ( 0.079 ) 
F test:   b  m=0 for Feb, Mar, Apr & May  F( 4,186042) = 824.76  ***  F( 4,186684) = 164.21  ***  F( 4,190619) = 5.68  ***  F( 4,190461) = 2.27  *  F( 4,190619) = 0.22  F( 4,184796) = 2.19  *  F( 4, 43102) = 2.46  ** 
F test:   b  m+  d  m=0 for Feb, Mar, Apr & May  F( 4,186042) = 7.89  ***  F( 4,186684) = 8.28  ***  F( 4,190619) = 4.05  ***  F( 4,190461) = 3.05  **  F( 4,190619) = 1.34  F( 4,184796) = 0.79  F( 4, 43102) = 0.40 
R-squared 
Root MSE 
Number of observations 
Note: All regressions are estimated by OLS and include the nominal interest rate and relative price changes as control variables. Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
184,846 
   
43,152  186,090  186,732  190,669  190,511  190,669 
0.0303  0.0088 
0.4216  0.549  0.4777  0.7242  0.2643  1.3022  2.4808 
0.4746  0.393  0.0359  0.0068  0.1283 
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(b) Male sole white-collar wage earner head households with bonus receipts in the regular bonus months (Narrowly-defined sample) 
Derived monthly patterns for Figures 4, 5, and 6 
WHH  DI  C  SC  NDC  SDC  DC 
Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Figure no.  4.1-(b)  4.2-(b)  5.1-(b)  6.1-(b)  6.2-(b)  6.3-(b)  6.4-(b) 
Pre-reform 
Jan dummy  a  0-1  -1.11 ( 0.008 )  ***  -1.24 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.20 (  0.015 )  ***  -0.11 (  0.022 )  ***  -0.20 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.42 ( 0.112 )  ***  -0.33 ( 0.169 )  *  Jan  a  1  (=  a  0  +  a  0-1)  -1.13  -1.21  -0.23  -0.15  -0.25  -0.23  -0.33 
Feb dummy  a  0-2  0.11 ( 0.005 )  ***  0.09 (  0.011 )  ***  0.04 (  0.015 )  ***  0.05 (  0.021 )  **  0.12 (  0.008 )  ***  -0.39 ( 0.061 )  ***  -0.07 ( 0.176 )  Feb  a  2  (=  a  0  +  a  0-2)  0.09  0.12  0.01  0.01  0.08  -0.20  -0.07 
Mar dummy  a  0-3  -0.07 ( 0.005 )  ***  -0.13 (  0.012 )  ***  0.08 (  0.015 )  ***  0.08 (  0.022 )  ***  0.02 (  0.008 )  ***  0.02 ( 0.050 )  0.09 ( 0.187 )  Mar  a  3  (=  a  0+  a  0-3)  -0.09  -0.10  0.05  0.04  -0.02  0.21  0.10 
Apr dummy  a  0-4  0.06 ( 0.005 )  ***  0.00 (  0.012 )  0.01 (  0.015 )  0.07 (  0.023 )  ***  0.02 (  0.008 )  **  -0.34 ( 0.056 )  ***  0.13 ( 0.170 )  Apr  a  4  (=  a  0  +  a  0-4  )  0.04  0.03  -0.02  0.04  -0.03  -0.15  0.14 
May dummy  a  0-5  -0.02 ( 0.005 )  ***  -0.16 (  0.013 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.015 )  **  -0.01 (  0.023 )  0.02 (  0.008 )  **  -0.26 ( 0.040 )  ***  -0.28 ( 0.170 )  *  May  a  5  (=  a  0  +  a  0-5  )  -0.04  -0.13  -0.06  -0.05  -0.03  -0.07  -0.28 
Jun dummy  a  0-6  0.60 ( 0.014 )  ***  0.69 (  0.018 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.015 )  -0.02 (  0.021 )  0.02 (  0.008 )  **  -0.20 ( 0.043 )  ***  0.32 ( 0.180 )  *  Jun  a  6  (=  a  0  +  a  0-6  )  0.58  0.71  -0.03  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01  0.33 
Jul dummy  a  0-7  -0.16 ( 0.026 )  ***  -0.24 (  0.029 )  ***  0.10 (  0.016 )  ***  0.14 (  0.022 )  ***  0.07 (  0.008 )  ***  0.04 ( 0.077 )  -0.01 ( 0.177 )  Jul  a  7  (=  a  0  +  a  0-7  )  -0.18  -0.21  0.07  0.11  0.02  0.23  0.00 
Aug dummy  a  0-8  -0.40 ( 0.013 )  ***  -0.42 (  0.017 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.015 )  ***  0.00 (  0.023 )  0.03 (  0.008 )  ***  -0.57 ( 0.063 )  ***  -0.42 ( 0.174 )  **  Aug  a  8  (=  a  0  +  a  0-8  )  -0.42  -0.39  -0.08  -0.04  -0.01  -0.38  -0.41 
Sep dummy  a  0-9  0.06 ( 0.005 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.010 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.015 )  -0.02 (  0.022 )  0.02 (  0.008 )  **  -0.41 ( 0.079 )  ***  0.08 ( 0.181 )  Sep  a  9  (=  a  0  +  a  0-9  )  0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.03  -0.22  0.08 
Oct  a  10  (=  a  0  )  -0.02  0.03  -0.03  -0.04  -0.05  0.19  0.01 
Nov dummy  a  0-11  0.04 ( 0.005 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.011 )  ***  0.04 (  0.015 )  ***  0.07 (  0.022 )  ***  0.06 (  0.008 )  ***  -0.17 ( 0.042 )  ***  0.24 ( 0.178 )  Nov  a  11 (=  a  0  +  a  0-11  )  0.02  -0.01  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.25 
Dec dummy  a  0-12  1.11 ( 0.007 )  ***  1.18 (  0.011 )  ***  0.20 (  0.015 )  ***  0.09 (  0.022 )  ***  0.27 (  0.009 )  ***  0.23 ( 0.046 )  ***  0.26 ( 0.168 )  Dec  a  12 (=  a  0  +  a  0-12  )  1.09  1.20  0.17  0.05  0.22  0.42  0.27 
Pre-reform & Public 
Jan dummy x Public dummy  b  1  -0.01 ( 0.008  )  -0.01 (  0.011 )  -0.03 (  0.017 )  *  -0.03 (  0.026 )  -0.01 (  0.011 )  -0.02 ( 0.047 )  0.09 ( 0.178 )  Jan  -1.13  -1.22  -0.26  -0.17  -0.25  -0.25  -0.23 
Feb dummy x Public dummy  b  2  0.00 ( 0.005  )  -0.01 (  0.012 )  0.00 (  0.016 )  0.03 (  0.024 )  0.00 (  0.010 )  -0.04 ( 0.049 )  0.06 ( 0.205 )  Feb  0.10  0.11  0.02  0.04  0.08  -0.23  -0.01 
Mar dummy x Public dummy  b  3  0.35 ( 0.005  )  ***  0.38 (  0.013 )  ***  0.06 (  0.019 )  ***  0.06 (  0.027 )  **  0.00 (  0.010 )  0.12 ( 0.053 )  **  0.18 ( 0.214 )  Mar  0.27  0.28  0.11  0.10  -0.02  0.33  0.28 
Apr dummy x Public dummy  b  4  -0.37 ( 0.006  )  ***  -0.41 (  0.016 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.020 )  -0.06 (  0.029 )  **  0.01 (  0.010 )  0.04 ( 0.049 )  -0.33 ( 0.193 )  *  Apr  -0.33  -0.38  -0.05  -0.03  -0.02  -0.12  -0.19 
May dummy x Public dummy  b  5  -0.01 ( 0.005  )  -0.02 (  0.018 )  -0.01 (  0.018 )  -0.03 (  0.026 )  0.00 (  0.009 )  -0.07 ( 0.046 )  0.09 ( 0.186 )  May  -0.04  -0.15  -0.07  -0.08  -0.03  -0.15  -0.19 
Jun dummy x Public dummy  b  6  0.34 ( 0.019  )  ***  0.36 (  0.023 )  ***  0.01 (  0.016 )  0.03 (  0.024 )  0.00 (  0.009 )  -0.02 ( 0.043 )  -0.07 ( 0.207 )  Jun  0.93  1.08  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  0.26 
Jul dummy x Public dummy  b  7  -0.52 ( 0.036  )  ***  -0.55 (  0.040 )  ***  0.05 (  0.018 )  ***  0.01 (  0.026 )  0.01 (  0.010 )  0.10 ( 0.043 )  **  0.50 ( 0.199 )  **  Jul  -0.70  -0.76  0.12  0.12  0.03  0.33  0.49 
Aug dummy x Public dummy  b  8  0.24 ( 0.017  )  ***  0.26 (  0.022 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.018 )  0.01 (  0.027 )  -0.01 (  0.010 )  -0.07 ( 0.044 )  -0.27 ( 0.185 )  Aug  -0.18  -0.13  -0.09  -0.02  -0.03  -0.44  -0.68 
Sep dummy x Public dummy  b  9  -0.01 ( 0.004  )  ***  -0.01 (  0.010 )  -0.03 (  0.017 )  *  -0.05 (  0.026 )  **  -0.01 (  0.009 )  0.04 ( 0.047 )  -0.02 ( 0.200 )  Sep  0.02  -0.02  -0.06  -0.11  -0.03  -0.17  0.07 
Oct dummy x Public dummy  b  10  0.04 ( 0.005  )  ***  0.04 (  0.013 )  ***  0.05 (  0.016 )  ***  0.07 (  0.025 )  ***  0.02 (  0.009 )  **  0.03 ( 0.046 )  0.34 ( 0.206 )  *  Oct  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.22  0.35 
Nov dummy x Public dummy  b  11  -0.02 ( 0.006  )  ***  -0.01 (  0.013 )  -0.02 (  0.016 )  -0.03 (  0.025 )  0.00 (  0.009 )  0.00 ( 0.045 )  0.05 ( 0.179 )  Nov  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.30 
Dec dummy x Public dummy  b  12  0.03 ( 0.008  )  ***  0.02 (  0.011 )  **  0.06 (  0.017 )  ***  0.07 (  0.025 )  ***  0.02 (  0.011 )  *  0.07 ( 0.045 )  0.10 ( 0.165 )  Dec  1.12  1.23  0.23  0.12  0.24  0.49  0.37 
Post-reform 
Jan dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  1  0.07 ( 0.010 )  ***  0.16 (  0.012 )  ***  0.08 (  0.015 )  ***  0.06 (  0.022 )  ***  0.08 (  0.010 )  ***  0.14 ( 0.044 )  ***  0.07 ( 0.158 )  Jan  -1.06  -1.05  -0.14  -0.09  -0.17  -0.09  -0.26 
Feb dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  2  0.00 ( 0.006 )  -0.01 (  0.012 )  -0.02 (  0.014 )  0.00 (  0.021 )  -0.01 (  0.008 )  -0.07 ( 0.044 )  0.13 ( 0.171 )  Feb  0.09  0.11  0.00  0.01  0.07  -0.27  0.07 
Mar dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  3  0.00 ( 0.005 )  -0.02 (  0.012 )  -0.04 (  0.016 )  **  -0.06 (  0.022 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.008 )  *  -0.03 ( 0.046 )  -0.15 ( 0.196 )  Mar  -0.09  -0.12  0.01  -0.02  -0.03  0.18  -0.05 
Apr dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  4  0.00 ( 0.006 )  0.02 (  0.016 )  0.01 (  0.016 )  0.01 (  0.023 )  0.01 (  0.008 )  0.06 ( 0.042 )  -0.26 ( 0.171 )  Apr  0.04  0.05  0.00  0.05  -0.02  -0.09  -0.13 
May dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  5  0.00 ( 0.005 )  0.01 (  0.015 )  0.00 (  0.016 )  -0.02 (  0.023 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  0.05 ( 0.040 )  0.17 ( 0.171 )  May  -0.04  -0.12  -0.06  -0.07  -0.03  -0.03  -0.10 
Jun dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  6  -0.04 ( 0.020 )  **  -0.06 (  0.022 )  ***  0.03 (  0.015 )  **  0.05 (  0.020 )  **  0.00 (  0.008 )  0.04 ( 0.039 )  -0.23 ( 0.178 )  Jun  0.54  0.65  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.10 
Jul dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  7  -0.06 ( 0.038 )  -0.03 (  0.040 )  -0.05 (  0.016 )  ***  -0.06 (  0.023 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.009 )  -0.13 ( 0.041 )  ***  0.10 ( 0.190 )  Jul  -0.24  -0.24  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.10  0.10 
Aug dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  8  0.03 ( 0.019 )  0.02 (  0.022 )  0.05 (  0.016 )  ***  0.05 (  0.023 )  **  0.00 (  0.009 )  0.14 ( 0.042 )  ***  0.33 ( 0.175 )  *  Aug  -0.39  -0.36  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.24  -0.08 
Sep dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  9  0.00 ( 0.005 )  0.03 (  0.010 )  ***  -0.01 (  0.015 )  -0.01 (  0.023 )  0.02 (  0.009 )  **  -0.02 ( 0.042 )  -0.03 ( 0.177 )  Sep  0.04  0.02  -0.05  -0.08  -0.01  -0.24  0.05 
Oct dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  10  -0.01 ( 0.005 )  -0.02 (  0.012 )  *  0.02 (  0.015 )  0.02 (  0.022 )  0.01 (  0.009 )  0.02 ( 0.042 )  0.33 ( 0.179 )  *  Oct  -0.03  0.01  0.00  -0.02  -0.04  0.21  0.33 
Nov dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  11  -0.01 ( 0.005 )  0.01 (  0.011 )  0.01 (  0.014 )  0.00 (  0.022 )  0.00 (  0.008 )  0.00 ( 0.041 )  -0.09 ( 0.167 )  Nov  0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.16 
Dec dummy x Post-reform dummy  c  12  -0.07 ( 0.010 )  ***  -0.16 (  0.011 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.015 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.021 )  *  -0.04 (  0.009 )  ***  -0.07 ( 0.041 )  *  -0.11 ( 0.157 )  Dec  1.02  1.04  0.13  0.01  0.18  0.35  0.16 
Post-reform & Public 
Jan dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. d  1  -0.04 ( 0.012 )  ***  -0.05 (  0.016 )  ***  -0.02 (  0.024 )  -0.04 (  0.036 )  -0.01 (  0.016 )  -0.02 ( 0.068 )  -0.04 ( 0.248 )  Jan  -1.10  -1.11  -0.19  -0.16  -0.19  -0.12  -0.21 
Feb dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. d  2  0.00 ( 0.008 )  0.04 (  0.019 )  **  0.01 (  0.023 )  0.00 (  0.034 )  0.00 (  0.013 )  0.02 ( 0.070 )  -0.09 ( 0.282 )  Feb  0.10  0.14  0.01  0.03  0.07  -0.28  0.04 
Mar dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. d  3  -0.37 ( 0.007 )  ***  -0.40 (  0.019 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.026 )  -0.03 (  0.037 )  0.00 (  0.014 )  -0.17 ( 0.075 )  **  -0.23 ( 0.301 )  Mar  -0.10  -0.13  0.03  0.01  -0.03  0.13  -0.09 
Apr dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. d  4  0.37 ( 0.009 )  ***  0.39 (  0.024 )  ***  0.03 (  0.028 )  0.03 (  0.039 )  -0.03 (  0.014 )  *  0.04 ( 0.071 )  0.51 ( 0.287 )  *  Apr  0.04  0.04  -0.01  0.02  -0.03  -0.02  0.06 
May dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  5  -0.01 ( 0.008 )  -0.03 (  0.025 )  0.04 (  0.025 )  0.07 (  0.037 )  *  0.00 (  0.013 )  0.07 ( 0.067 )  0.05 ( 0.282 )  May  -0.05  -0.17  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  0.04 
Jun dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. d  6  -0.10 ( 0.028 )  ***  -0.11 (  0.033 )  ***  -0.04 (  0.024 )  -0.08 (  0.034 )  **  0.00 (  0.013 )  0.00 ( 0.063 )  0.38 ( 0.287 )  Jun  0.78  0.90  -0.03  -0.05  -0.02  0.02  0.41 
Jul dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  7  0.19 ( 0.055 )  ***  0.21 (  0.058 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.026 )  -0.02 (  0.036 )  -0.01 (  0.014 )  -0.03 ( 0.064 )  -0.49 ( 0.286 )  *  Jul  -0.56  -0.58  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.17  0.10 
Aug dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  8  -0.06 ( 0.026 )  **  -0.07 (  0.032 )  **  0.01 (  0.026 )  0.03 (  0.038 )  0.02 (  0.014 )  -0.02 ( 0.065 )  -0.16 ( 0.265 )  Aug  -0.21  -0.18  -0.03  0.05  -0.01  -0.33  -0.52 
Sep dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum. d  9  -0.01 ( 0.007 )  -0.01 (  0.016 )  0.02 (  0.024 )  0.02 (  0.036 )  -0.02 (  0.014 )  -0.03 ( 0.067 )  0.13 ( 0.278 )  Sep  0.02  0.00  -0.06  -0.10  -0.03  -0.22  0.16 
Oct dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  10  -0.01 ( 0.008 )  0.01 (  0.018 )  -0.03 (  0.023 )  -0.06 (  0.035 )  0.00 (  0.013 )  -0.06 ( 0.066 )  -0.68 ( 0.285 )  **  Oct  0.01  0.05  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.18  -0.01 
Nov dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  11  0.02 ( 0.009 )  ***  0.00 (  0.018 )  -0.01 (  0.023 )  -0.03 (  0.034 )  0.00 (  0.013 )  0.08 ( 0.066 )  -0.11 ( 0.252 )  Nov  0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.01  0.10  0.10 
Dec dum. x Public dum. x Post-reform dum.  d  12  0.03 ( 0.012 )  ***  0.04 (  0.015 )  **  0.01 (  0.024 )  0.00 (  0.035 )  0.02 (  0.015 )  -0.01 ( 0.065 )  0.20 ( 0.241 )  Dec  1.08  1.10  0.20  0.08  0.22  0.41  0.47 
Constant  a  0  -0.02 ( 0.003 )  ***  0.03 (  0.01 )  ***  -0.03 (  0.011 )  **  -0.04 (  0.016 )  **  -0.05 (  0.006 )  ***  0.19 ( 0.032 )  ***  0.01 ( 0.133 ) 
F test:   b  m=0 for Feb, Mar, Apr & May  F( 4, 69087) = 2313.76  ***  F( 4, 69117) = 375.26  ***  F( 4, 70783) = 2.92  **  F( 4, 70758) = 3.06  **  F( 4, 70783) = 0.51  F( 4, 69197) = 2.13  *  F( 4, 16440) = 0.98 
F test:   b  m+  d  m=0 for Feb, Mar, Apr & May  F( 4, 69087) = 3.94  ***  F( 4, 69117) = 3.06  **  F( 4, 70783) = 0.76  F( 4, 70758) = 1.56  F( 4, 70783) = 0.63  F( 4, 69197) = 0.76  F( 4, 16440) = 0.31 
R-squared 
Root MSE 
Number of observations 
Note: All regressions are estimated by OLS and include the nominal interest rate and relative price changes as control variables. Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
69,247 
   
16,490  69,135  69,165  70,833  70,808  70,833 
0.0354  0.0100 
0.3902  0.5047  0.4575  0.6684  0.2569  1.2435  2.4782 
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Figure 1. Month-on-month change in income for public employee households:
1.1-(a)  Wage of household head (Broadly-defined sample) 1.1-(b) Wage of household head (Narrowly-defined sample)
1.2-(a)  Disposable income (Broadly-defined sample) 1.2-(b) Disposable income (Narrowly-defined sample)
Note: See Table 4 for the estimated regression coefficients.











































   
Figure 2. Month-on-month change in consumption expenditure of public employee households:
2-(a)  Consumption expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 2-(b)  Consumption expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Note: See Table 4 for the estimated regression coefficients.























Figure 3. Month-on-month change in expenditure of public employee households by expenditure component: 
3.1-(a) Services expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 3.1-(b)  Services expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
3.2-(a)  Non-durables expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 3.2-(b)  Non-durables expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
3.3-(a)  Semi-durables expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 3.3-(b)  Semi-durables expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
3.4-(a) Durables expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 3.4-(b) Durables expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Note: See Table 4 for the estimated regression coefficients.


























































































Figure 4. Month-on-month change in income: Households of office workers at large private sector firms vs. Public employee households
4.1-(a)  Wage of household head (Broadly-defined sample) 4.1-(b) Wage of household head (Narrowly-defined sample)
4.2-(a)  Disposable income (Broadly-defined sample) 4.2-(b) Disposable income (Narrowly-defined sample)
Note: See Table 5 for the estimated regression coefficients.
































































Figure 5. Month-on-month change in household expenditure: Households of office workers at large private sector firms vs. Public employee households
5-(a)  Consumption expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 5-(b)  Consumption expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Note: See Table 5 for the estimated regression coefficients.



























Figure 6. Monthly-on-month change in expenditure by component: Households of office workers at large private sector firms vs. Public employee households
6.1-(a)  Services expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 6.1-(b)  Services expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
6.2-(a)  Non-durables expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 6.2-(b)  Non-durables expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
6.3-(a)  Semi-durables expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 6.3-(b)  Semi-durables expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
6.4-(a)  Durables expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) 6.4-(b)  Durables expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Note: See Table 5 for the estimated regression coefficients.















































































































   
Appendix 1. Month-on-month change in income/expenditure for public employee households during the phase-out period
We omitted observations during the phase-out period (between July 2002 and June 2003) from our analyses in the main text, as
including the phase-out period, when the abolition of the March bonus was announced as a news, would obscure the point
of our study on the effect of an anticipated income change. For readers interested in what happened in the phase-out period
this appendix compares the pattern during the phase-out period with those of pre-reform and post-reform periods.
Wage of household head (Broadly-defined sample) Wage of household head (Narrowly-defined sample)
Disposable income (Broadly-defined sample) Disposable income (Narrowly-defined sample)
Real consumption expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Real consumption expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)






































































   
Appendix 2. Classification of expenditure categories
The classification of expenditure categories in this study follows that used by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications (various years) in the published tabulations of the FIES.
Durables: household durables, automobiles, communication equipment, and recreational durable goods.
Semi-durables: clothing, footwear, sporting goods, video games, computer hardware and software, and
books.
Non-durables: food (except eating out), fuel, light, and water charges, medicines, film, plants and
gardening goods, and tobacco.
Services: eating out, rent for housing, medical expenses, public transportation, communication (except
communication equipment), education (except school textbooks and reference books), recreational
services and personal care services.41 
 
 
   
Appendix 3. Sample average based seasonal patterns of income and expenditures
All figures reported in the main text are based on the regression results, which imposes some artificial restrictions. To confirm that the 
findings of this paper result from those artificial restrictions, this appendix reports similar month-on-month change figures based on 
simple sample average.
(a) Public worker households
Month-on-month change in wage of household head (Broadly-defined sample Month-on-month change in wage of household head (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in disposable income (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in disposable income (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in real consumption expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real consumption expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)































































Appendix 3. Sample average based seasonal patterns of income and expenditures (continued)
(a) Public worker households (continued)
Month-on-month change in real service expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real service expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in real non-durable expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real non-durable expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in real semi-durable expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real semi-durable expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)



























































































   
Appendix 3. Sample average based seasonal patterns of income and expenditures (continued)
(b) Private & large firm office worker households vs. Public worker households
Month-on-month change in wage of household head (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in wage of household head (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in disposable income (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in disposable income (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in real consumption expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real consumption expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)











































































Appendix 3. Sample average based seasonal patterns of income and expenditures (continued)
(b) Private & large firm office worker households vs. Public worker households (continued)
Month-on-month change in real service expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real service expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in real non-durable expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real non-durable expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)
Month-on-month change in real semi-durable expenditure (Broadly-defined sample) Month-on-month change in real semi-durable expenditure (Narrowly-defined sample)




































































































Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Pre-reform/private
Pre-reform/public
Post-reform/private
Post-reform/public